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IN

THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

JANET BOWCUT (deceased)
Plaintiff-Respondent
v.
DON LESLIE BOWCUT,
Defendant-Appellant

:
:
:
:

COURT of Appeals
NO. 940361-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DON LESLIE BOWCUT

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on this matter
pursuant to Section §78-2a-3 (2)(h) Utah Code Ann, 1953, as
amended•

This appeal is from a final judgement entered in the

Fourth District Court, Case Number 784448131, on May 13, 1994 by
the Honorable Steven L. Hansen.

ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue One:

Did the Trial Court error when granting

guardianship to Helen Jensen absent a judicial termination or
suspension of the father's parental rights? Utah Code Ann §75-5204 (Exhibit A ) .

The Appellant will show that proper procedure

was not followed in the granting of guardianship, and thus the
appointment of guardian and conservator was invalid and all
subsequent actions were without standing.
1
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Issue Two:

Did the Trial Court error in proceeding under

the parties original divorce action and was there proper
jurisdiction?
According to Utah law a custody order ceases to operate on
the death of the custodial parent, and the court making the order
loses its jurisdiction over the surviving parent and the child.
Opinion, Court of Appeals of Utah in Nielson v Nielson, 826 P.2d
1065 (Utah 1991) (Exhibit B ) .
Issue Three:

The Trial Court did not appear to make a

ruling as to Motion To Set Aside Order Appointing Guardian and
Conservator, Case Number 93340310 (Exhibit C) even though the
ruling stated that all of the cases and motions would be
consolidated.
Issue Four:

Did the Trial Court error in not offsetting

Social Security death benefits minor child receives as a result
of his mother's death? Utah Code Ann §78-45-7.5(8)(b) (Exhibit
D).

Judge Hansen cites Utah Code Ann §78-45-7.5 (8)(a) as

evidence that Utah law does not allow a child's Social Security
benefits to be included in calculating support.

Careful review

of the above entitled Utah law will show that section (8)(a) was
referring to Supplemental Security Income while section (8)(b)
clearly states that Social Security Benefits may be used.
Issue Five:

Did the Trial Court error in including the

defendant's second job in calculating gross income?

Utah law

prohibits the use of a second income if the first income is

2
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equivalent of one full time job. Utah Code Ann §78-45-7-5(2)
(Exhibit D ) .
Issue Six:

Did the Trial Court error in not taking into

consideration self employment expenses (e.g. self employment
taxes and medical education loan payments).

The income used to

calculate the defendant's gross income was derived from self
employment. Utah Code Ann §78-45-7.5(4)(a) (Exhibit D ) .
Issue Seven:

Was Utah law followed in calculation of the:

worksheet to determine the Appellant's obligations to children in
his present home. The Appellant has three children as a result
of his second marriage, yet in calculating his obligation to
children in his present home, credit was given for only two
children.

Utah Code Ann §78-45-7.2 (Exhibit E ) .

Issue Eight:

Did the Trial Court error in awarding support

to the guardian retroactive to the death of the custodial parent?
The Appellant will show that the Utah Supreme Court has found in
similar cases that the non-custodial parent has no obligation to
pay "child support" after the death of the custodial parent
Nielson v Nielson supra (Exhibit B ) .
Issue Nine:

Did the Trial Court abuse itsf discretion in

awarding attorney fees to plaintiff.

Judge Hansen refers to

Lynale v Lyngle 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992) as support for his
decision to award attorney fees to plaintiff.

In this case, as

in cases throughout Utah law, attorney fees were awarded because
the action was taken to enforce the provisions of a divorce
decree.

The actions taken by Helen Jensen were in fact a
3
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modification of the original divorce decree and not an issue of
enforcement.

NATORE OF PROCEEDINGS
The above-entitled case came before the court on March 18,
1994 for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of who
should be guardian for the minor child, David Charles Bowcut, and
how much support should be paid for his best interest and
welfare.

Case number 933400310 wherein Helen Jensen had been

appointed Guardian and Conservator of the minor child which had
been contested by the Appellant, and case number 934402209
wherein Helen Jensen brought an action to enforce support for and
in behalf of the minor child which was also contested by the
Appellant, were both consolidated into case number 784448131 so
that all issues pending before the Fourth Judicial District Court
regarding the rights of the minor child and the obligations of
the Appellant could be resolved.

At the^ hearing, testimony was

heard regarding the child's needs and the Appellant's ability to
pay.

The Appellant's counsel brought it to the court's attention

that there were other issues to be considered but no testimony
was taken regarding these other issues. The Appellant, in his
testimony, argued that the court lacked jurisdiction, stating
that he had been assured by the Utah County Attorney's office
that case number 784448131 had died with the demise of the other
party of the divorce.

4
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On April 5, 1994, the Honorable Judge Hansen handed down the
Ruling and on May 13, 1994 the order was filed wherein the
Appellant was ordered to pay support in excess of the amount
requested by either the plaintiff's attorney or the guardian ad
litem.

Judge Hansen maintained that he had jurisdiction to rule

because the minor child does have standing to maintain an action
against his natural father for support via his guardian ad litem.
The issue regarding the wrongful appointment of Helen Jensen as
guardian and the Appellant's request to set aside order
appointing guardian and conservator was not addressed in the
Ruling nor Order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

David Charles Bowcut (hereafter referred to as minor child)

was born to Don Leslie Bowcut (hereafter referred to as
Appellant) and Janet Sue Bowcut on January 31, 1977.
2.

On or about March 2, 1978 a divorce decree (case #784448131)

was signed and entered where the custody of minor child was
awarded to Janet Bowcut.
3.

On or about February 5, 1993 Janet Wing (Bowcut), custodial

parent of minor child, (then age 16), died due to suicide.
4.

Since the death of his mother, the minor child has refused

to live with his father, Appellant, and his maternal grandmother,
Helen Jensen has supported him in this decision.

5
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5.

On or about August 13, 1993 Helen Jensen filed a Verified

Petition For Appointment of Guardian and Conservator under civil
number 93340310 (Exhibit F) .
6.

On or about September 3, 1993 Helen Jiensen appeared before

Judge Guy R. Burningham for a hearing on the appointment of
Guardian and Conservator.

At that time the Court granted Helen

Jensen's petition and executed the Order in open court (Exhibit
P.).
7.

On or about October 22, 1993, Helen Jensen, as Guardian and

Conservator of the minor child, filed a Verified Petition for
Child Support and Maintenance under Civil number 934402209*
8.

On or about October 29, 1993, Appellant filed an answer in

civil case number 934402209 in which he alleges that Helen Jensen
was fraudulently appointed Guardian and Conservator (Exhibit G ) .
9.

On November 4, 1993 an Order To Show Cause hearing was held

before Judge Steven L. Hansen regarding jurisdiction, child
support arrearage, and Appellant's on-going child support
obligation.
10.

On November 24, 1993 the Court found that Appellant had an

on-going support obligation to the minor child under the parties
original divorce decree case number 784448131 and that the minor
child did have standing to maintain an action against his natural
father for support via a guardian ad litem, and Ron Wilkinson was
so appointed (Exhibit H ) .

With regard to jurisdiction, the Court

found that the Court has continuing jurisdiction to make an award
of support, pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-5(3).
6
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11.

On December 13, 1993 a Motion For Order To Show Cause To Set

Aside Order Appointing Guardian And Conservator was filed by
Appellant regarding case number 93340310 (Exhibit C ) .
12.

On December 23, 1993, a hearing was held before Judge

Hansen, regarding the status of the case and Appellant's
financial status for purposes of establishing amount of child
support.
13.

On January 18, 1994 Appellant filed a request for a Full

Evidentiary Hearing.
14.

On or about January 21, 1994, Mr. Bowcut filed a motion to

consolidate case number 93340310, case number 934402209, and case
number 784448131 so that all of the outstanding issues could be
addressed at the Evidentiary Hearing (Exhibit I ) .
15.

On March 21, 1994, the Evidentiary Hearing was held and the

Trial Court heard argument regarding Appellant's ability to
provide support, and Appellant argued against the jurisdiction of
the court to act on the original divorce decree due to the death
of the custodial parent.
16.

On the 5th day of April 1994, Judge Hansen issued the ruling

confirming the jurisdiction, consolidating the three cases and
establishing the amount of child support (Exhibit J).

On May

13th 1994 he signed the Order executing the ruling (Exhibit K ) .
17.

On or about June 10, 1994, Appellant filed a Notice Of

Appeal of the Evidentiary Hearing (Exhibit L ) .

7
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18.

On or about July 12, 1994, Appellant filed a Petition For

Extraordinary Writ regarding the appointment of guardianship and
the November 24, 1994 Ruling.
19.

On or about July 21, 1994, the Utah Court Of Appeals denied

the Petition For Extraordinary Writ because an avenue of relief
still remained at the Trial Court level via Rule 60(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
20.

On or about July 26, 1994, the Appellant filed with the

Fourth District Court a Motion For Relief From Judgment on both
the appointment of guardian and the November 24, 1994 ruling.
21.

On or about August 5, 1994, Mrs. Jensen's counsel filed a

Motion For Stay Of All Proceeedings And Motion For Joint (One)
Decision By Judges Burningham And Hansen wherein she argues that
the issue of guardianship and jurisdiction are now pending
resolution at the Appellate Court level (Exhibit M ) .
22.

On or about August 10, 1994, Appellant field an Answer To

Motion For Stay Of All Proceedings And Motion For Joint (One)
Decision By Judges Burningham And Hansen And Request For Final
Ruling wherein he asked the court to rule as to relief from
judgment so that if relief is given remand can be requested from
the appellate court, and if relief is denied, the Appellant can
enter appeals from both orders and have all issues resolved at
the appellate level (Exhibit N ) .

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant contends that the above matter should never
have come before the trial court.

Immediately upon learning of

the usurpation of his parental rights by Mrs. Jensen through her
counsel, the Appellant contested the ruling.

Utah law jealously

protects the natural parent from such actions absent a judicial
determination or suspension of the fathers parental rights. The
original ruling is still being contested at the trial court level
under Rule 60(b)(7) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Appellant

holds that since Helen Jensen was illegally placed as guardian,
she lacks standing in the above entitled matter.
The Appellant further contends that the court lacks
jurisdiction to make any ruling under case number 784448131 and
thus both the November 24, 1993 ruling awarding child support and
the subsequent evidentiary hearing are void.
Regarding the amount of support awarded the Appellant holds
that Utah law was circumvented in several instances in arriving
at the judgment amount. Therefore support, if deemed
appropriate, should be set at a lower amount and the final
judgment reduced.

ARGUMENT
Issue One:

Under Utah law, natural parents have the right to

the custody and control of their minor children absent a judicial
termination or suspension of their parental rights. Accordingly,
upon the death of the custodial parent, custody of the children
9
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vests in the non-custodial parent absent the termination or
suspension of the parental rights Nielson v Nielson supra
(Exhibit B ) .
Further, Uniform Probate Code §75-5-204 states that the
Court may appoint a guardian for an un-emancipated minor only if
all parental rights of custody have been terminated or suspended
by circumstances or prior court order.

Utah Code §78-3f outlines

the necessary procedure for termination of parental rights.
Grounds for termination are outlined in §78-3f-107. Under the
Utah and United States Constitution, the moving party must show
unfitness, abandonment or substantial neglect before parental
rights are terminated In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah Sup.Ct.
1982):

...By the same token, we conclude that the right of a
parent not to be deprived of parental rights without a
showing of unfitness,
abandonment, or
substantial
neglect is so fundamental to our society and so basic
to our constitutional
order that it ranks among those
rights referred to in Article I, §25 of the Utah
Constitution
and the Ninth Amendment of the United
States Constitution
as being retained by the
people...
...It
is fundamental to our jurisprudence
that nthe
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in
the parents...
and that the parents'
right "to
direct
the upbringing and education of children under
their
control"...is
protected by the
Constitution...
...No court can, for any but the gravest of
reasons,
transfer a child from its natural parent to any other
person...since
the right of a parent, under natural
law, to establish
a home and bring up children is a
fundamental one and beyond the reach of any
court...
In custody disputes between a parent and a non-parent, a
rebuttable presumption arises in favor of the natural parent
10
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Hutchison v Hutchison 649 P.2d 38. Jurisdiction for termination
of parental rights lies with the Juvenile Court §78-3a-16 (l)(f).
Fourth District Court of Utah County Case Number 93340310,
granted appointment of Guardian and Conservator of David Charles
Bowcut to Helen Jensen.

The court procedure as outlined in

Uniform Probate Code §75-5-207 (Exhibit A) was followed with the
exception of the requirement of section §75-5-204. Utah law
clearly protects the custodial parent from termination of
parental rights without the Juvenile Court, in a separate
hearing, granting such termination. Utah law does allow the
custodial parent to irrevocably relinquish parental rights but
only by certified signing of the proper consent instrument Utah
Code Ann. §78-3f-114.
Prior to Helen Jensen's appointment as Guardian and
Conservator of the Appellant's minor child, neither an act of the
Juvenile Court nor a voluntary relinquishing of parental rights
was obtained.

Mrs. Jensen's counsel purposefully filed to obtain

guardianship for Helen Jensen without the benefit of first
removing the Appellant's parental rights because she knew that a
move to remove his rights would have erupted a legal battle that
she could not possibly win.

In the process, the natural parent

was not given even rudimentary explanation of the effect of
guardianship being awarded —
have erupted.

again because a legal battle would

Then, after the 30 day period of appeal had

expired she finally allows the father of the child (who had not
sought counsel because of assurance that all actions were taken
11
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simply to allow Helen Jensen to register the child in school —
that no rights had been given up) to know the purpose, intent,
and legal ramifications of her actions.
The natural parent is very explicitly protected from such
slight of hand action by Uniform Probate Code §75-5-204 which
states that the father's rights must be first taken away before
proceeding to appoint guardianship.
rights —

He can willfully waive his

but only through a semiformal proceeding in which the

ramifications of his signing is completely explained.
There is no doubt that Mrs. Jensen's counsel carefully
orchestrated this deception from the very beginning —

thinking

that if she could keep the ruse up for 30 days after the
guardianship ruling, the Appellant's constitutional right would
have somehow expired.

Such actions are fraudulent and

doubtlessly illegal under Utah law yet she maintained in her
response to the Appellant's request for Summary Disposition that
they are irrevocable because of a 30-day rule. The Appellant can
show that he immediately took actions to regain full custody upon
discovery of the breech of his rights.
In her response to the Appellant's request for Summary
Disposition, Mrs. Jensen's counsel maintained that the court
actions granted guardianship to Helen Jensen while the Appellant
retained his full parental and custodial rights (see RESPONSE TO
THE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION Points and
Authorities, argument III paragraphs 1 and 3 [Exhibit P]).

She

seems to hold that case number 93340310 has placed the Appellant
12
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in the unique position of having sustained his full legal
custodial rights while guardianship is granted to another party.
Utah law clearly states that such a position cannot exist and
does not provide for child support in such a position.
Legal custody according to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-2(14)
(1953) means a relationship embodying the following rights and
duties:
(a) the right to physical custody of a child;
(b) the right and duty to protect, train, and
discipline him;
(c) the duty to provide him with food, clothing,
shelter, education and ordinary medical care;
(d) the right to determine where and with whom he
shall live;
(e) the right, in an emergency, to authorize
surgery and other extraordinary care.
In McLaughlin v. Todd 145 S.W.2d 725, and Barry v. Sparks 27
N.E.2d 728, the court finds that in the death of the custodial
parent, the non-custodial parent is immediately vested custody
and has an obligation to support via common law (thus provide
food, clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care)
n

accompanying this obligation to support is the right on the part

of the father to the custody, society, and services of the
child.n

The Court holds that the father has the right to demand

that the child reside in his home so that he can supervise his
actions, education and use of support. As early as October 1993,
correspondence from the Appellant's counsel will show that the
Appellant was happy to support the child in his home (Exhibit Q ) .
The minor child has refused to live with his father and Helen
Jensen with her counsel has defended his decision.
13
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The Utah

Supreme Court in the case In re J.P. supra gives the following
opinion:
Stanley v. Illinois [405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208,
31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)] and Quilloin v. Walcott [434
U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct 549, 555, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978)]
demonstrate that the termination of parental rights
solely on the basis of the child's best interest and
without any finding of parental unfitness, abandonment,
or substantial neglect, violates the parent's
liberty
right under the due process clause of the United States
Constitution.
Unlike substantive due process cases
like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 34
L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), which rely on a "right of privacy"
not mentioned in the Constitution to establish other
rights unknown at common law, the parental liberty
right at issue in this case is fundamental to the
existence of the institution
of the family, which is
"deeply rooted
in
this
Nation's
history and
tradition,...tt.
While the illegal appointment of Helen Jensen took place
prior to and in a different court than the Order herein appealed,
the Appellant holds that the matter is still relevant to this
case for the following two reasons:
1)

The Appellant's efforts to contest the appointment of

guardianship were never ruled upon prior to the evidentiary
hearing and were consolidated into the evidentiary hearing.
2)

Even without relief from judgment at the trial court level,

the Appellant holds that the fact that his constitutionally
protected rights were deprived him in the appointment of Helen
Jensen as guardian without due process of law warrants the Appeal
Court's overruling of subsequent actions taken by the illegally
placed guardian.

14
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Issue Two:

In the November 24, 1993 Ruling (Exhibit H)

regarding the Appellant's obligation for child support/ the
honorable Judge Hansen orders that the Appellant has an on-going
child support obligation under the parties' original divorce
decree (case #784448131).

He maintains that pursuant to U.C.A.

§30-3-5(3) the court had continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or arrangements as it is reasonable and
necessary and may be required in any given case. Against the
Appellant's argument of improper jurisdiction secondary to the
death of the custodial parent, Judge Hansen ruled that the
original divorce decree still stood and that the current actions
were modifications of that original divorce decree (case
#784448131).
In the evidentiary hearing, the Appellant contested the
trial court's continuing jurisdiction during his sworn testimony
(see trial transcript page 55 [Exhibit R]) wherein he reaffirms
that he was told by the Utah County Attorney office that case
number 784448121 had died with his former wife and could not be
reopened.
According to Utah law, in divorce proceedings, a custody
order ceases to operate on the death of the custodial parent, and
the Court making the Order loses its jurisdiction over the
surviving parent and the child.

The rights and obligations of

the surviving divorced parent are those of a surviving parent,
unaffected by the custody decree entered in the divorce
proceeding.

This opinion, stated by the Court of Appeals of Utah
15
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in Nielson v Nielson supra/ is supported by many historical cases
such as McLaughlin v Todd supra, Barry v Sparks supra, and Mowry
v Smith, 82 R.I. 82, 105 A.2d 815.
In Nielson v Nielson supra the Utah Court of Appeals gives
the following opinion:

We conclude that the custody order ceases to
operate upon the death of [custodial
parent] and that
the right to custody already vested in
[non-custodial
parent].
In addition we find that
[non-custodial
parent] is no longer required to pay child
support.
In McLaughlin v Todd, supra, the Court:
...Held, that so long as the mother lived the

judgment operated to give her the custody of the
children,
and to compel the father to provide her with
the means for their support.
Beyond that period the
judgment ceases to have any effect.
The father's
rights
over the children being restored,
as he is bound to
provide for all their wants, he is also entitled
to
their care and custody...The
order of judgment is only
to be between the parties—husband
and wife.
When that
relation
is terminated by the death of either,
the
object of the order and its vitality
ceases, and the
surviving party is restored to his or her natural
rights.
...Where court in granting wife divorce ordered
husband to pay certain sum for support of minor child,
until death of wife husband's liability for support of
his child was limited by decree, and on death of wife
divorce action abated and husband's common-law
liability for support of his child supplanted decree,
and chancery court was thereafter without jurisdiction
to order husband to pay to child's guardian accrued
installment under the decree.
Thus, Utah law holds that the Trial Court had lost its
jurisdiction upon the death of the custodial parent, Janet Wing
(Bowcut).
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The Utah Supreme Court holds in State of Utah Department of
Social Services v Vigil 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1989):

...Subject
matter jurisdiction
is the authority and
competency of the court to decide the
case...personal
jurisdiction,
on the other handf is the court's
ability
to exercise its power over a person for the purposes of
adjudicating his or her rights and liabilities.
A lack
of either is fatal to a court's authority to decide a
case with respect to a particular
litigant.
The Appellant holds that while the District Court is able to
show that it had jurisdiction as to subject matter in this case,
it lacks the personal jurisdiction to act upon the original
divorce decree parties after the death of one of the parties.
"A judgment is void only if the court that rendered it
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties
or was otherwise incompetent to render judgment." Richins v
Delbert, Chipman, & Sons, 817 P.2d 382.
The Appellant contends that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over the parties of the original divorce decree
secondary to the death of one of the parties. Under Utah law, no
court in the state can reopen, revive, or readdress case number
784448131.
Issue Three:

Approximately six weeks after the appointment of

Helen Jensen as Guardian of his minor child and immediately after
learning the ramifications of such appointment, the Appellant
filed an answer in civil case number 934402209 in which he
alleges that Helen Jensen was fraudulently appointment Guardian
and Conservator (Exhibit G).

On December 13, 1993 he filed a
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Motion For Order To Show Cause To Set Aside Order Appointing
Guardian And Conservator (Exhibit C ) .
In his January 21# 1994 Memorandum of Points and Authorities
(Exhibit I), the Appellant requested that case number 784448131,
number 934402209, and number 93340310 be consolidated to "avoid
further confusion, to resolve the issue of who should be guardian
for the minor child, David Charles Bowcut, and how much support
should be paid for his best interest and welfare."
In the April 5, 1993 Ruling (Findings of Fact and Conclusion
of Law [2]) (Exhibit J) the court agrees that all three cases "in
which child support for David Charles Bowcut are at issue should
be consolidated."

While the March 18, 1994 evidentiary hearing

was a vital component to the eventual April 5 1994 ruling, the
Appellant contends that the ruling was to finally resolve all of
the previous issues that had been consolidated into case number
784448131.
The Appellant contends that a ruling regarding his motion to
set aside was due after the evidentiary hearing and was not
given.
Issue Four:

During the March 18, 1994 evidentiary hearing all

parties agreed that the minor child's Social Security benefits
that he has received since the death of his mother should be
factored in somehow in computing the child support obligation of
the father.

Judge Hansen stated to Mrs. Jensen's counsel "you

don't dispute that that should be considered by the court in
making a judgment" to which Mrs. Jensen's counsel replied "No, I
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think it must be considered because that was the point of the
Social Security system.

Was that was [sic] a benefit accrued by

the mother, that upon her death would be as though she was paying
child support for supporting him.

So I think it should be

considered and I think it's to the court's discretion how it's
considered." (transcripts page 18; line 17-25 [Exhibit R})
Later all parties discussed whether the Social Security
payments would be considered as income of the mother which was
then given in total to the child or whether the amount would be
subtracted from the total child support obligation, (transcripts
page 22-24 [Exhibit R]).

It was made clear throughout the

proceedings that the Social Security benefits would be considered
one way or the other.
In the April 5, 1994 ruling, Judge Hansen cites U.C.A. §7845-7.5 (8)(a) as reason for not considering the Social Security
benefits.

The law reads "Gross income may not include the

earnings of a child who is the subject of the child support
award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own right, such as
Supplemental Security Income". U.C.A. §78-45-7.5 (8)(b) (Exhibit
D) states "Social Security benefits received by a child due to
the earnings of a parent may be credited as child support to the
parent upon who's earning record it is based, by crediting the
amount against the potential obligation of that parent."
Thus Utah law clearly does hold that Social Security
benefits may be used in such cases.

Since all parties, including

Judge Hansen, agreed that the Social Security benefits should and
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would be considered, the Appellant holds that the trial court
erred in not considering the benefits.

The Appellant finds the

notion of considering the Social Security benefit as the total
income of the mother insulting to common sense. Under normal
circumstances the child certainly wouldn't receive either
parent's total income, but instead a calculated fraction thereof.
The Appellant maintains that the Social Security benefits should
be considered as the mother's contribution to the total support
obligation.

The gross income would then be calculated by going

back to the Child Support Obligation Table, finding the monthly
adjusted income that would correlate with a child support
obligation of $233.00, and then adding that monthly adjusted
income (which in this case is $1,750.00) to the Appellant's
monthly adjusted income to compute the final total child support
obligation.
Issue Five:

During the March 18, 1994 evidentiary hearing, the

court heard testimony that the Appellant was self-employed as a
physician and had taken a second job at the Utah County Jail to
pay his tremendous student loan obligation upon payment becoming
due.

During the hearing the guardian ad litem, acting on behalf

of the child, asked that the Appellant's obligation be calculated
using only his private practice income and not his second job
(transcript page 70, line 8 [Exhibit R]).

U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(2)

states "Income from earned income sources is limited to the
equivalent of one full-time job.11

The Appellant argues that he

spends an equivalent amount of time in his practice to other
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physicians in the area.

Because of physicians' extensive weekend

and after hour on-call obligations, most take the equivalent of
one weekday off per week.

The Appellant took his second job

during his "day off".
The Appellant insists that it is not up to the court's
discretion to decide whether a second job will be included in the
determination of gross income but a matter of Utah law.
Issue Six;

The Appellant holds that the Trial Court should

have subtracted his small business tax and medical loan payments
in computing his gross income pursuant to §78-45-7.5(4)(a) and
(b) (Exhibit D).

Because he is self-employed, the Appellant paid

$4703.00 in 1993 in self employment tax — i n addition to income
tax and FICA paid by all wage earners. This is obviously income
that is unavailable to him and the debt is incurred because of
his self-employment.

Further, the Appellant paid in 1993

$12808.00 in student loan repayment —

debt which again was

incurred because of his line of work and representing money
unavailable to him.

Thus the court should have based his support

obligation on a gross income $17511.00 less than the figure used.
Again, this does not appear to be a matter up to the court's
discretion but a matter of Utah law.
Issue Seven:

During the evidentiary hearing it was noted by

both Judge Hansen (transcript page 61 line 8 [Exhibit RJ) and
Mrs. Jensen's counsel (transcript page 61 line 24) that the
Appellant had three children by his current marriage and that any
computation of his support obligation would have to take into
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consideration his concurrent obligation to those three children.
With the April 5, 1994 ruling the Appellant received a copy of
the Child Support Obligation worksheet used to compute his
obligation.

Only two children from his current marriage were

used in computing his obligation (Exhibit J).

While the

worksheet is only a guideline to be followed by the court at its
own discretion, the Appellant holds that since the court had
decided to follow the worksheet the obligation should reflect the
proper number of children in his current marriage.
Issue Eight;

In the Ruling and Order herein appealed, Judge

Hansen ordered that the obligation for support be retroactive to
the death of the child's mother.

The court states in the April

5, 1994 ruling (Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, section
6) that all parties involved in the matter agreed at the March
18, 1994 hearing that any modification of the child support award
should be made retroactive to the date of the custodial parent's
death.

Careful review of the transcripts from the March 18, 1994

hearing will show that in fact all parties did not so agree. The
issue was brought up briefly but never resolved, and at no point
did all parties agree that the obligation would be retroactive to
the child's mother's death.
As argued under issue one, custody of the child
automatically falls upon the non-custodial parent upon the death
of the custodial parent.

In Nielson v Nielson supra, the court

finds "because custody of the children has vested in Martin, she
is no longer obligated to pay child support." Mrs. Jensen did
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not have physical nor legal custody of the minor child until
September 3, 1993. To make the child support order retroactive to
a period prior to her appointment as guardian is obviously
contrary to Utah law.
Issue Nine;

Mrs. Jensen was awarded attorney's fees and court

costs in the amount of $1105^00 because

f,

Mrs. Jensen was forced

to bring the defendant before this court in order to obtain
support for the defendant's minor child.

The court, noting that

defendant had previously taken the position that his support
obligation was extinguished by the death of the custodial parent,
believes the (sic) Mrs. Jensen had little choice in bringing this
matter before the court in order to obtain the support necessary
for the minor child, David Bowcutt (sic).,f

The court referred to

Lyngle v Lyngle supra, in which the Utah Court of Appeals stated
that:
In this suit, Wife is not seeking to obtain or modify a
divorce decree but to enforce the provisions
of a
decree she obtained in 1986. In an action to enforce
the provisions
of a divorce decree, an award of
attorney fees is based solely upon the
court's
discretion,
regardless
of the financial
need of the
moving party.
Judge Hansen seemed to justify the award on the grounds that
the Appellant had refused to pay child support from the time of
the child's mother's death until court ordered him to do so ten
months later.

Since Mrs. Jensen did not have guardianship or

physical custody nor had even petitioned for guardianship until
seven months after the death of the custodial parent — the
Appellant maintains that he neither had any obligation under Utah
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law to pay support nor had anyone to pay such support to —

as he

was the custodial parent.
The Appellant holds that any and all actions taken by Mrs,
Jensen wherein she would have accrued attorney and court costs
were taken to obtain or modify a child support judgment. The
Appellant made monthly payments, despite the fact he had no legal
obligation, to Mrs. Jensen equal to the amount of the divorce
decree from the time she obtained guardianship.

Her subsequent

actions were taken to first establish that she had the right to
demand child support and then to modify the original divorce
decree so that she could increase the support obligation. In
Tribe v Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P.2d 213,216 (1921)
When one party "is compelled to bring
proceedings
against" another to enforce compliance with a divorce
decree, a trial court may award reasonable
attorney
fees to the moving party so that the party is not
forced "to fritter
away in costs and counsel
fees"
funds received under the decree "by bringing
repeated
actions"
Also in Stuber v Stuber. 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650, 652 (1952)
In wife's suit to enforce alimony payments,
court
stated "It was [her ex-husband'sJ
failure
to live up to
his agreement which forced her to commence this
action.
There can be no doubt that attorney's
fees are
allowable in actions of this
type.
While Mrs. Jensen's counsel went to great extremes to make
it appear as though the Appellant was refusing to pay the court
ordered support, the record will show that in fact the Appellant
was never so much as tardy on his payments. This was never a
matter of enforcement and thus the Appellant argues that the
award of attorney fees is not based solely upon the trial court's
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discretion.

He further maintains that he has incurred several

thousand dollars expense in an attempt to protect his United
States and Utah Constitutionally protected rights and thus, upon
a ruling in his favor, is entitled to compensation for his full
expenses.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Appellant maintains that the original
action to deny him his constitutionally protected rights to due
process of law in the appointment of Mrs. Helen Jensen as
guardian and conservator of his minor child was performed
contrary to Utah law, was never accepted by the Appellant, and
was to finally be settled in the Order herein appealed.

All

subsequent actions taken by Mrs. Jensen against the Appellant are
without standing.
Further, the Appellant has shown that Utah law explicitly
denies the trial court, or any court, the jurisdiction to act
upon the original divorce decree after the death of one of the
parties.

Both the November 4,1993 and March 18, 1994 hearings

were without jurisdiction and the fact that Judge Hansen bestowed
upon his court the jurisdiction citing Faver v Hansen 803 P.2d
1275 (Utah App. 1990) was in err and did not legitimatize the
hearing.

According to Utah law both Orders are void.

The Appellant has gone on to show that in setting the
judgment amount, the trial court exceeded its discretion —
directly contrary to Utah law.

often

With the numerous significant
25
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errors that were made In the calculation of support, the
Appellant holds that the Order stands virtually Irreparable and
thus should be overturned.

Should the court be interested In

justly setting a support obligation,

the Appellant maintains

that the child's Social Security benefit would have to be
considered, only the primary employment of the Appellant would be
considered, credit would be given for self-employment taxes and
student loan payments, the Appellant would be given credit for
the correct number of children in his current home, and the
obligation would begin upon Mrs. Jensen's petitioning for
support.

Because all actions taken by Mrs. Jensen were to obtain

and/or modify a divorce decree, the award of attorney's fees
should be reversed.
Lastly, the Appellant feels justified in requesting that the
Court order Mrs. Jensen to repay the $3750.00 that he has paid to
her since her appointment as guardian, to pay the trial court
level costs of the Appellant of $1,550.00, and to pay the appeals
court costs of $483.50

DATED this

and attorney fees of $2,000.00.

/7 day of August, 1994.

DON L E S L I E ^ O W O n ? ^
Acting in pro Se
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der a will probated in another state which is the testator's domicile.
(5) Upon acceptance of appointment, written notice
of acceptance shall be given by the guardian to the
minor and to the person having his care, or to his
nearest adult relative.
1985
75-5-202.5. Appointment of guardian by written
instrument.
(1) The parent of an unemancipated minor may appoint a guardian by written instrument designating
the guardian. An appointment by written instrument
becomes effective where:
(a) the written instrument is filed with the petition for appointment of guardian in the court
having probate jurisdiction in the county of residence of the last parent to die, if death occurred
in the state, and otherwise in the court having
probate jurisdiction in the county in which the
minor resides in the state; and
(b) the person appointed as guardian filed in
the court having jurisdiction an affidavit of acceptance which states:
(i) the name, address, and age, or birthday
if known, of the minor;
(ii) the name, address, and telephone
number of the appointee-guardian;
(iii) the names of the parents of the minor
and that both are dead or that any surviving
parent has been adjudged incapacitated;
(iv) the name of the parent who was last
to die and the county where that parent resided at the date of his death;
(v) that the appointee-guardian knows of
no other appointment of a guardian which
supersedes the appointment by written instrument;
(vi) that the appointee-guardian accepts
the appointment.
(2) The latest document appointing a guardian,
whether will or written instrument, which is executed by the last parent to die has priority.
(3) Upon acceptance of an appointment, written
notice of acceptance shall be given by the guardian to
the minor, if he is 14 years of age or older, and to the
person having his care or to his nearest adult relative.
(4) For purposes of this chapter, "instrumental"
refers to a written instrument as described in this
1985
section.
75-5-203. Objection to appointment
Any person interested in the welfare of a minor, or
a minor of 14 years or older, may file with the court
in which the will is probated or the written instrument is filed a written objection to the appointment
before it is accepted or within 30 days after notice of
its acceptance. An objection may be withdrawn. An
objection does not preclude, after a hearing on the
objection, appointment by the court in a proper proceeding of the testamentary or instrumental nominee, or any other suitable person.
1985
75-5-204. Court appointment of guardian of
minor — Conditions for appointment
The court may appoint a guardian for an unemancipated minor if all parental rights of custody have
been terminated or suspended by circumstances or
prior court order. A guardian appointed by will under
Section 75-5-202, or by written instrument under Section 75-5-202.5, whose appointment has not been prevented or nullified under Section 75-5-203 has priority over any guardian who may be appointed by the

court, but the court may proceed with an appointment upon a finding that the testamentary or instrumental guardian has failed to accept the testamentary appointment within 30 days after notice of the
guardianship proceeding.
1985
75-5-205. Court appointment of guardian of
minor — Venue.
The venue for guardianship proceedings for a
minor is in the place where the minor resides or is
present.
1975
75-5-206. Court appointment of guardian of
minor — Qualifications — Priority of
minor's nominee.
The court may appoint as guardian any person
whose appointment would be in the best interests of
the minor. The court shall appoint a person nominated by the minor, if the minor is 14 years of age or
older, unless the court finds the appointment contrary to the best interests of the minor.
1975
75-5-207. C o u r t a p p o i n t m e n t of g u a r d i a n of
minor — Procedure.
(1) Notice of the time and place of hearing of a
petition for the appointment of a guardian of a minor
is to be given by the petitioner in the manner prescribed by Section 75-1-401 to:
(a) the minor, if he is 14 years of age or older;
(b) the person who has had the principal care
and custody of the minor during the 60 days preceding the date of the petition;
(c) any living parent of the minor; and
(d) any guardian appointed by the will or written instrument of the parent of the minor who
died last.
(2) Upon hearing, if the court finds that a qualified
person seeks appointment, venue is proper, the required notices have been given, the requirements of
Section 75-5-204 have been met, and the welfare and
best interests of the minor will be served by the requested appointment, it shall make the appointment.
In other cases the court may dismiss the proceedings
or make any other disposition of the matter that will
best serve the interest of the minor.
(3) If necessary, the court may appoint a temporary
guardian, with the status of an ordinary guardian of
a minor, but the authority of a temporary guardian
may not last longer than six months.
(4) If, a t any time in the proceeding, the court determines that the interests of the minor are or may be
inadequately represented, it may appoint an attorney
to represent the minor, giving consideration to the
preference of the minor if the minor is 14 years of age
or older.
1980

75-5-208. Consent to service by acceptance of
appointment — Notice.
By accepting a testamentary, instrumental, or
court appointment as guardian, a guardian submits
personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the guardianship that may be instituted by any interested person or any person interested in the welfare of the minor. Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to the guardian or mailed
to him by ordinary mail at his address as listed in the
court records and to his address as then known to the
petitioner. Letters of guardianship shall indicate
whether the guardian was appointed by will, written
instrument, or by court order.
1985
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NIELSON v. NIELSON

Utah 1065

Cttea»S26 T2d 1065 (UuhApp. 1991)

/
Gregory NIELSON, as Personal Representative of the estate of Kirk T. Nielson, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

3. Parent and Child *=>2(2)
Parents have the right to custody and
control of their minor children over all others absent termination or suspension of
parental rights. U.C.A.1953, 75-5-204.

Shelly H. NIELSON (Martin), Defendant
and Appellant*

4. Constitutional Law «=»82(10)
Infants *=>155, 156, 157
Utah and United States Constitutions
recognize and protect inherent and retained
right of parent to maintain parental ties to
his or her child and, under both Constitutions, moving party must show unfitness,
abandonment, or substantial neglect before
parental rights are terminated.

No. 900317-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct 1, 1991.
Mother appealed from order of the
First District Court, Cache County, John F.
Wahlquist, J., which awarded custody to
father. During pendency of the appeal,
father died. The Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate PJ., held that (1) custody
order ceases to operate upon death of the
custodial parent and court making the order loses jurisdiction over surviving parent
and child; (2) rights and obligations of surviving divorced parent are those of a surviving parent unaffected by custody decree; and (3)findingin the divorce proceeding that mother was not a fit person for
the care, custody, and control of the minor
child was not a determination of unfitness
which would terminate her parental rights.
Ordered accordingly.

1. Divorce e=»304
In divorce proceedings, custody order
ceases to operate on the death of a custodial parent, and court making the order loses
its jurisdiction over surviving parent and
the child.
2. Divorce *=>304
Rights and obligations of surviving divorced parent are those of a surviving parent, unaffected by custody decree entered
in divorce proceeding; following death of
custodial parent, right to custody ordinarily
vests in the surviving parent
* Editor's Note: This opinion was originally published at 818 P.2d 1043. It is republished to

5. Parent and Child <s»2(8)
In custody disputes between parent
and nonparent, rebuttable presumption
arises in favor of the natural parent
6. Divorce «=>302
Trial court'sfindingin divorce proceeding that mother was not a fit person for
the care, custody, and control of the minor
was not a determination of unfitness so as
to terminate her parental rights upon death
of father, the custodial parent U.C.A.
1953, 78-3a-48.
7. Divorce <*=252.3(1)
Trial court did not err in decreasing
mother's property award from $26,500 to
$25,000 upon agreement that husband
would pay the $25,000 in cash within 30
days of settlement
8. Divorce «=>225
Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying attorney fees to mother based on
finding that fees were neither justified nor
reasonable and that father did not have the
ability to pay the mother's fees.
Shelly H. Martin, Salt Lake City, pro se.
A.W. Lauritzen (argued), Logan, for
plaintiff and appellee.
Before BILLINGS, Associate PJ., and
GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ.
correct a pnnting error.
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OPINION
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Defendant, Shelly Martin, appeals from
the trial court's order awarding custody of
the parties' three minor children to her
former husband, Kirk T. Nielson. During
the pendency of this appeal, Nielson died
and his personal representative was substituted as the plaintiff in this action. We
conclude that the custody order ceased to
operate upon the death of Nielson and that
the right to custody automatically vested in
Martin. In addition, we find that Martin is
no longer required to pay child support
Finally, we affirm the trial court's order
with regard to the property award, attorney fees, and costs.
Nielson and Martin were divorced on
March 31, 1987. Three children were born
to the parties: Brandy, Jacob, and Kasey,
currently ages 16, 12 and 10 respectively.
The parties stipulated that Nielson would
have custody of Brandy and Jacob while
Martin would have custody of Easey. The
decree awarded Martin $26,500 plus interest as her portion of the equity in the
parties' home. In May of 1988, Martin
filed a petition for modification of the divorce decree, requesting custody of all
three children and payment of the property
award. Nielson filed a counter petition,
seeking custody of the children. While the
modification proceedings were pending,
Nielson married Barbara Nielson and Martin married William Martin.
On August 7, 1990, the court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The court found that Brandy would have
serious problems if allowed to reside with
Martin and her new husband, that it was
inconceivable to require Jacob to live with
Martin in light of his marked antipathy for
Martin's husband, and that Kasey should
1. Baram v. Schwartz, 151 Conn. 315, 197 A2d
334, 335 (1964). See also McLaughlin v. Todd,
201 Ark. 348, 145 S.W.2d 725, 727 (1940) (Divorce action abates upon the death of a party to
the divorce); Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173,
11 S.E^d 782, 788 (1940) C[U]pon the death of
one of the parties divorced by judicial decree,
the divorce proceeding falls so far as concerns
any further right to the custody of children.");
State v. Superior Court of Marion County, 242
Ind. 42, 176 N.E.2d 126 (1961) (Although the

not be separated from her siblings. The
court also found that Nielson was a fit and
proper person for the care, custody, and
control of the minor children. In addition,
the court stated that defendant, while residing with William Martin, is not a fit
person for the care, custody and control of
the minor children. The court awarded
Nielson custody of the three children. In
addition, the court ordered Nielson to pay
Martin $25,000 within thirty days in settlement of the property award. No attorney
fees and costs were awarded. Martin filed
this appeal.
After this case was scheduled for oral
argument in this court, Nielson died. Nielson's counsel advised the court of his
client's death and indicated that the case
may be moot. In subsequent communications with the court, Nielson's counsel,
A.W. Lauritzen, declined to file a suggestion of mootness. In addition, Martin requested that the court proceed with the
appeal. Pursuant to a motion for substitution, Gregory Nielson, as personal representative of Nielson's estate, was substituted for Nielson. During oral argument,
Lauritzen and Martin informed the court
that the children presently reside with their
paternal grandparents. Lauritzen asserted
that Martin is not entitled to custody of the
children due to the trial court'sfindingthat
she is not a fit person for the care, custody,
and control of the minor children. Martin
stated that the children have been told that
she is not entitled to custody.
[1,2] We must first address the vitality
of the trial court's custody award in light
of Nielson's death. In divorce proceedings,
a custody order ceases to operate on the
death of the custodial parent, and the court
making the order loses its jurisdiction over
the surviving parent and the child.1 The
trial court in a divorce'proceeding has continuing jurisdiction over the custody and support of
minor children even after final judgment in the
action, when a party to the action dies, the
court's jurisdiction ceases with regard to the
custody and control of the children); Barry v.
Sparks, 306 Mass. 80, 27 H.E26 728 (1940)
(Upon the death of one of the parents, the
divorce decree ceases to have any further effect,
at least when it makes no provision for its
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ent, a rebuttable presumption arises in favor of the natural parent Hutchison v.
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982).
The presumption recognizes the natural
right and authority of the parent to custody of the child, and
is rooted in the common experience of
mankind, which teaches that parent and
[3] The Utah Supreme Court has also
child normally share a strong attachment
held that upon the death of the custodial
or bond for each other, that a natural
parent, the right to custody of the children
parent will normally sacrifice personal
immediately vests in the noncustodial parinterest and welfare for the child's beneent under Utah Code Ann. § 75-13-18
fit, and that a natural parent is normally
(1953). In re O'Hare, 9 Utah 2d 181, 341
more sympathetic and understanding and
P.2d 205, 206 (1959). Section 75-13-18,
better able to win the confidence and
which has been repealed and replaced by
love of the child than anyone else.
the Utah Uniform Probate Code, provided
that "[h]usband and wife living together IcL at 41; see also Kishpaugh v. Kishare joint guardians of their minor children, paugh, 745 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1987); Rasper
with equal powers, rights and duties with v. Nordfelt, 815 P.2d 747 (Utah App.1991).
respect to the control and custody . . . of
Thus, under Utah law, natural parents
their minor children
" Although sechave the right to the custody and control of
tion 75-13-18 has been repealed, Utah
their minor children absent a judicial termiCode Ann. § 75-5-204 (Supp.1991) indicates
nation or suspension of their parental
that parental rights must be terminated or
rights. Accordingly, upon the death of the
suspended before the court may appoint a
guardian for an unemancipated minor. custodial parent, custody of the children
Thus, under the current statute, parents vests in the noncustodial parent absent a
have the right to the custody and control of termination or suspension of parental
their minor children over all others absent rights.
rights and obligations of the surviving divorced parent are those of a surviving parent, unaffected by the custody decree entered in the divorce proceeding.2 Following the death of the custodial parent, the
right to custody ordinarily vests in the surviving parent3

a termination or suspension of parental
rights.

[6] In this case, the trial court's finding
that Martin was not a fit person for the
[4,5] In addition, the Utah and United care, custody and control of the minor chilStates Constitutions recognize and protect dren was made in the context of Martin's
the inherent and retained right of a parent fitness in comparison to Nielson's fitness in
to maintain parental ties to his or her child. a custody dispute. No court has deterIn re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364,1372 (Utah 1982). mined that Martin is "unfit" within the
Under both constitutions, the moving party meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-48
must show unfitness, abandonment, or sub- (1987). Likewise, no proceedings have esstantial neglect before parental rights are tablished that Martin abandoned the chilterminated. IcL at 1375. Further, in custo- dren or substantially neglected the children
dy disputes between a parent and a nonpar- under section 78-3a-48 or Utah Code Ann.
continuance beyond the lives of the parents);
Mowry v. Smith 82 R.I. 82. 105 AJ2d 815. 817
(1954) (Upon the death of a custodial parent,
the decree is without effect as to any further
rights thereunder to such custody).

2. McLaughlin v. Todd, 201 Ark. 348. 145 S.W.2d
725. 727 (1940); Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass. 178.
106 N.E. 595. 596 (1914); Clarke v. Lyon, 82
Neb. 625. 118 N.W. 472, 474 (1908).
3. Brown v. Brown, 218 Ark. 624. 238 S.W.2d 482
(1951); Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 11
SJE^d 782. 788 (1940); State v. Superior Court

of Marion County, 242 Ind. 42. 176 N.E.2d 126
(1961); In re Hohmann's Petition, 255 Minn.
165. 95 N.W.2d 643. 646-47 (1959); Mowry v.
Smith, 82 R.I. 82. 105 A.2d 815. 817 (1954);
Harrelson v. Davis, 415 S.W.2d 293. 296
(Tx.Ct.Civ.App. 1967); In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d
818. 823 (Wyo.1970). But see Abrams v. ConnoU
ly, 781 P2d 651, 657 (Colo.1989) (en banc)
(Death of the custodial parent does not automatically vest the noncustodial parent with custody.
In Colorado, the best interests of the child are
the overriding considerations.).
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§ 78-3a-16 (Supp.1991). Therefore, upon
Nielson's death, custody of the children
vested in Martin, and she has an immediate
right to custody of her children.
Martin also claims the trial court erred in
ordering her to pay child support Because
custody of the children has vested in Martin, she is no longer obligated to pay child
support
[7] Martin also claims the trial court
erred in decreasing her property award
from $26,500 plus interest to $25,000.
However, the parties agreed on the record
that plaintiff would pay defendant $25,000
in cash within thirty days in settlement of
the property award. In view of that settlement, we find no error in the court's order
decreasing the property award to $25,000.
[8] Finally, Martin claims the trial court
erred in failing to award her attorney fees
and costs. The decision to award attorney
fees rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court Morgan v. Morgan, 795
P.2d 684, 687-88 (Utah App.1990). However, the award must be based on evidence
of financial need and reasonableness. Id
at 688. In addition, we review the trial
court's award of costs under an abuse of
discretion standard. Id at 686. The trial
court found that Martin's fees were neither
justified nor reasonable, and that Nielson
did not have the ability to pay Martin's
fees. The court then found that defendant
was not entitled to an award of attorney
fees and that the parties should bear their
own costs. Based on these findings, we
find no error in the trial court's failure to
award Martin attorney fees. In addition,
wefindno abuse of discretion in the failure
to award Martin costs.
We have examined the remaining arguments presented on appeal and find they
are without merit

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jose Richard QUINTANA, Defendant
and Appellant*
No. 900264-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct 4, 1991.

Defendant entered a guilty plea in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Leonard H. Russon, J., and moved to withdraw that plea. The Court of Appeals,
Orme, J., held that, even if amendment
creating a 30-day limit for making motions
to withdraw guilty pleas applied retroactively, State failed to preserve defendant's
lack of compliance with the statute as an
issue to consider on appeal.
Reversed and remanded.

Criminal Law <*=>1031(4)
State's passing reference to statutory
amendment making 30-day time limit to
move to withdraw guilty pleas effective did
not preserve question of timeliness for consideration on appeal, and, thus, even if
amendment could be applied retroactively
to bar motion to withdraw guilty plea, lack
of compliance with statute was not preserved for review. U.C.A.1953, 77-13-6;
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11 (Repealed).

Connie L. Mower, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, and Judith S.H. Atherton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.

GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ.,
concur.
I KEY NUMttt SYSTEM/

Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME,
JJ.
* Editor's Note: This opinion was originally puolished at 818 P.2d 1047. It is republished to

correct a printing error.
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Fii-ED n-lisfa
four* JudtaSa: D\%vki CowM —
o! UT?.!". County Si3?o 'M Utah
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Minor Child
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE TO SET ASIDE ORDER
APPOINTING GUARDIAN AND
CONSERVATOR

In re: DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT,
an emancipated minor child.

Case No.
Judge:

<\&*W°

COMES NOW, Don Leslie Bowcun and hereby moves the Court for an Order
to Show Cause ordering Helen Jensen to appear and show cause, if any she may have, why the
Order Appointing Guardian and Conservator should not be set aside on the grounds and for the
reasons set forth in the accompanying Affidavit.
DATED this / ^

day of November, 1993.

A/-/

$Hr

ROBERT L. MOODY
da.misctaioc-bowcucc

l
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Minor Child
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721

CV.-MV

St

«.
C A q « i 6 SWiT^s
•J:A-

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

In re: DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT,
an emancipated minor child.

AFFIDAVIT

Case No. 4 2 * 4 D 2 l °
Judge:

COUNTY OF UTAH )
: SS
STATE OF UTAH
)
Don Leslie Bowcutt, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1. I am the father of the above-named minor child.
2. The minor child's mother died on the 5th day of February, 1993.
3.

Since the mother's death, the above-named minor child has moved on a

frequent basis and has not stayed in the same home for more than 60 days.

1
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4. Upon the filing of the Petition for Appointment of Guardian and Conservator,
Helen Jensen represented to me that she would see that the child maintained a steady and proper
home and would further see that said child was properly enrolled in school to enable said child
to become focused and pursue his best interests and welfare.
5. That, contrary to the representations of Helen Jensen, she has failed to see that
the child be properly enrolled in an appropriate school and, instead, is now claiming that the
child is being "home taught".
6.

It is in the best interest and welfare of said child that he be placed in a

structured home where he could and would be required to attend a proper school and in a setting
where appropriate discipline could be administered should he not pursue proper educational and
vocational pursuits.
7. That as the father of said child I am entitled to provide guidance, direction and
the duties now being assumed by Helen Jensen as Guardian and Conservator.
8. That, had I known Helen Jensen would not bring the focus and see that the
child was properly enrolled in school and subject to a course of discipline to bring about proper
goals and pursuits, I would not have consented to the guardianship.
9. It is reasonable and appropriate that the guardianship be set aside and that
Helen Jensen be ordered to appear and show cause, if any she may have, why the court should
not enter an order setting aside the appointment of Helen Jensen as Guardian and Conservator
and in her place appointing me as the father of said child.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,2J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DATED this _ / £ % o f November, 1993.

DON LES

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /A

day of November.

NOTARY PUBUC
Residing at: Provo, Utah
My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBUC
STATE OF UTAH

wpu iLm

OUHNE ANDERSON

'j

"KMT

t

2525 N. Canyon M.
ProycUtthMWI

da.miscUff-bowcatt
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78-45-7.5

78-45-7.4/ Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. (
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's 1989, ch. 214 be, 1989, pursuant to
25.

Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L.
I, ch. 214, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective incomefromany source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) incomefromsalaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimonyfromprevious marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
onmeans-tested" government programs.
^ comefromearned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
^time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
<r\ (c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
5Kma) Gross incomefromself-employment or operation of a business shall
M)e calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operationfromgross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differfromthe
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of
tax returnsfromat least the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources
according to the source. Verification of incomefromrecords maintained
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer
statements and income tax returns.
665
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78-45-7.5

JUDICIAL CODE

(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(hi) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
such as Supplemental Security Income.
Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
t may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.

a

History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a

parent, the income shall be based" for "Income
shall be imputed to a parent based," and made
a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214
became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Modification of award.
Cited.
Modification of award.
When the parties had agreed to the amount
of child support before the effective date of the
child support guidelines, the trial court erred
in modifying child support when no petition to
modify had been filed and in modifying the

support amount without finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred
since the previous order had been entered.
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(l)(b) prior to 1990
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on
existing support orders).
Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

\
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78-45-7.1

\
JUDICIAL CODE

mother's health, and set the award at $200 per
month per child. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Modification of support
—Divorce decree.
The divorce decree establishes the duty of
support the ex-husband owes to his ex-wife and
a complaint under this section to modify that
duty of support is improper. Mecham v.
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977).
State recovery of assistance to child.
State, which was joined as a party to the divorce action before court entered order deter-

mining husband's obligation for child support,
was entitled to reimbursement from the husband for assistance furnished the child before
entry of the order for support in the amount,
based upon the relevant factors as set out in
this section, as set out in the support order.
Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979).
Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d
696 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Proctor v. Proctor,
773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Moon v.
Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 791 P.2d 895 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, New Standards
for Child Support Enforcement in Utah, 1986
Utah L. Rev. 591.
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in
Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 859.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband

and Wife § 330 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent
and Child § 54 et seq.
C.J.S. — 41 C J.S. Husband and Wife § 48
et seq.; 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 50.
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife *=> 4;
Parent and Child *=» 3.1(5).

78-45-7.L Medical and dental expenses of dependent children — Assigning responsibility for payment —
Insurance coverage.
When no prior court order exists or the prior court order makes no specific
provision for the payment of medical and dental expenses for dependent children, the court in its order:
(1) shall include a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the dependent
children; and
(2) may include a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children
if insurance coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 13, § 3; 1990, ch. 166, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the subsection designations, substituted "is or be-

comes available" for "is available" in Subsection (2), and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Divorce, maintenance
and health care of parties, § 30-3-5.

78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from
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ties, § 30-3-5.

ve order establish^
after July 1,1989|
j a rebuttable pjr
mporary or p e ™ ^

78-45-7.2

the application of the guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or
not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the
presumption in that case.
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of
that parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the
option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (5).
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the respective parents for the additional children. The obligations
shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before determining the award in the instant case.
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be applied
to mitigate an increase in the award, but may not be applied to justify a
decrease in the award.
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment of the guidelines and
any subsequent change in the guidelines constitutes a substantial or material
change of circumstances as a ground for modification of a court order, if there
is a difference of at least 25% between the existing order and the guidelines.
With regard to IV-D cases, the office may request modification, in accordance
with the requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law 100-485,
no more often than once every three years.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, § 3; 1990,
ch. 275, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment by ch. 100, effective April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (4), which had read "(a) A
noncustodial parent's obligation to provide
child support for natural born or adopted children of a second family arising subsequent to
entry of an existing child support order may
not be considered to lower the child support
awarded to the first family in the existing order.
"(b) If the custodial parent of the first family
petitions to increase child support, all natural
born and adopted children of the noncustodial
parent may be considered in determining
whether to increase the award," and added
Subsection (5).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 275, effective
October 13,1990, in Subsection (1) deleted the
designation (a) and deleted former Subsection

(b), which read "Neither the enactment of the
guidelines or any consequent impact of the
guidelines on existing child support orders constitute a substantial or material change of circumstances as a ground for modification of a
court order existing prior to July 1,1989. However, if the court finds a material change of
circumstances independent of the guidelines,
the guidelines may be applied to modify a court
order existing prior to July 1,1989," and added
Subsection (5).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Federal Law. — The Family Support Act of
1988, Public Law 100-485, cited in Subsection
(6), amended various sections throughout Title
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601
et seq.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NOTICE OF FORMAL PETITION
AND HEARING

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF:

Probate No. 933400310

DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT

Notice is hereby given that on AUGUST 13, 1993, the
VERIFIED PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR
was filed by: HELEN JENSEN.
A copy of the petition is on file with the Clerk of the Court and may be reviewed
upon request.
The petition has been set for hearing in this court at 125 NORTH 100 WEST,
PROVO, UTAH on SEPTEMEBER 3,1993, 8:00 AM before the HONORABLE
GUY R BURNINGHAM, COURTROOM #302.
Carma B. Smith,
?rk of the Court
DATED::

CuM^.lt*>m?>
Deputy Clerk

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

PROOF OF POSTING AND MAILING

The undersigned, being sworn, states that copies of the within notice were posted in a conspicuous
place at the Courthouse and in at least two other places in Utah County, Utah, and that the copies of said
notices remained posted in such places for ten consecutive days immediately preceding the time for the hearing
referred to in said notice. True copies of the foregoing were mailed postage prepaid to the persons and
addresses shown on the mailing list.
DATED:

Qufy. IU>, Pfib

VA^uAi43Jofa/lo

SUBSCRIBED ANDSWORN TO before me this
/(J> day of UU&', 1993.
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PROBATE MAILING UST
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT, 1404 JORDAN AVE, PROVO UT
HELEN JENSEN, 1404 JORDAN AVE, PROVO UT
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT, 1220 E 1200 N, AMERICAN FORK UT
ROSEMOND G BLAKELOCK ESQ, 2230 N UNIVERSITY SUITE 9-D,
PROVO UT 84604
y , ^—__
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF:

CASE NO. 933400310
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT

DATE: September 3, 1993
'

JUDGE: Guy R Burningham
REPT. BY: Vonda Bassett, CSR
CLERK: tf

VERIFIED PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR
This matter came before the Court for the above-entitled hearing. Rosemand
Blakelock was present in behalf of the petitioner Helen Jensen and the minor David Charles
Bowcutt, who were also present.
The minor was sworn and testified by direct examination by the Court.
The Court called for any objections and none were made. Therefore, the Court
granted the petition and executed the order in open court.
Letters may be issued.
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Rosemond G. Blakelock #6183
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A.
Attorneys for Petitioner
Cotton Tree Square Suite 9-D
2230 N. Univ. Pkwy.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-7678

SEP 3 8 so aiH3

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN RE:
:
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT
::
An Unemancipated minor child. :

LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP
AND CONSERVATORSHIP

Case No. 933400310

HELEN JENSEN was duly appointed and qualified as Guardian and
Conservator of the above-named minor child.
These

letters

are

issued

to

evidence

the

appointment,

qualification, and authority of the said Guardian and Conservator.
' WITNESS/ my signature and Seal of this Court, this ^
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Rosemond G. Blakelock #6183
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A.
Attorneys for Petitioner
Cotton Tree Square Suite 9-D
2230 N. Univ. Pkwy.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-7678
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

::
:
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT, ::
An Unemancipated minor child. :
IN RE:

:

ORDER APPOINTING
GUARDIAN
AND CONSERVATOR

Case No. 93340310

Upon consideration of the Petition for Appointment of Guardian
and Conservator filed by HELEN JENSEN, the Court finds, upon
hearing, that a qualified person has petitioned for appointment as
Guardian and Conservator of the above minor, that venue is proper,
that required notices were given or waived, that all requirements
for appointment under the Utah Uniform Probate Code have been met,
and that the best interest and welfare of the minor will be served
by the appointment of Petitioner as Guardian and Conservator.

THEREFORE, HELEN JENSEN is hereby appointed Guardian and
Conservator

of

the

minor,

to

act

without

bond

and

qualification and acceptance, Letters of Guardianship and
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upon

Conservatorship shall be issued to,said Petitioner.
DATED this

S

day of <^L^&***^n^

1993.

BY THE COURT:
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Rosemond G. Blakelock #6183
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A.
Attorneys for Petitioner
Cotton Tree Square Suite 9-D
2230 N. Univ. Pkwy.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-7678
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT AS
GUARDIAN
AND CONSERVATOR
Case No. 93340310

IN RE:
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT
An Unemancipated minor child.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH )
HELEN JENSEN states and represents to the Court that:
1.

I am the natural grandmother and custodial party for the

above-mentioned minor and am interested in his welfare.
2.

The minor's mother is deceased, he does not reside with

his father and he still has a need for assistance and guidance.
3.
mentioned

I accept Guardianship and Conservatorship of the aboveminor

and

assume

all

the

duties

and

obligations

associated with said positions.
DATED this >?

day of

1993.

7M.

HELEN JENSE;
Petitioner

4f
SUBSCRIBED

AND

SWORN

to

me

before

this
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Defendant
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HELEN JENSEN, individually,
and as Guardian and Conservator
of the Minor David C. Bowcut,
Plaintiff,

:

ANSWER

:
:

v.

:

DON LESLIE BOWCUT,

:

Defendant.

:

Case No. 934402209
Judge:

COMES NOW the Defendant and in answer to Plaintiffs Petition admits, denies
and alleges as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim against the Defendant upon which relief
can be granted.

1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiff, Helen Jensen, has no individual standing or capacity to bring this action.
THIRD DEFENSE
1. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 1.
2. Defendant admits that Petitioner is the natural maternal grandmother of the
minor child and further admits that Plaintiff was fraudulently appointed Guardian and
Conservator on September 3, 1993 which is or will soon be contested and denies the remaining
allegations of paragraph 2.
3. Defendant admits that Charles Bowcut was born January 31, 1977 and that
Defendant is the natural father of said child but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph
3. As an affirmative matter Defendant alleges, upon information and belief, that the child is not
going to school, is working full time, receives social security benefits resulting from the death
of his mother, and has become an emancipated person.
4. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 4.
5. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 5.
6. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 6 and as an affirmative matter
alleges that the minor child has been shifting from residence to residence of duration of three
to four weeks and has lived in not less than five different residences since March of 1993 and
as a further aflBrmative matter alleges that Petitioner, contrary to her representations of wanting

2
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to provide for his schooling and best interest and welfare, has been unable to or unwilling to
control and bring focus and order to said minor child's life.
7. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 7.
8. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 8.
9. Upon information and belief, Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph
9 but in the event said child is in need affirmatively alleges that Defendant has always provided
for said child's support and continues to be willing to provide for said child's support but the
lack of order and agenda of shifUessness has either emancipated said child or he has become a
neglected child and his custody should be returned to the father or the Division of Family
Services.
10. This Defendant is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the
allegations of paragraph 10 and on this basis denies the same until evidence can be produced.
11. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 11 and as an affirmative matter
asserts that said statutory allegation is inapplicable to the facts of this matter.
12. Defendant admits that he resides in Pleasant Grove, Utah and is a medical
doctor but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 12.
13. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 13.
14. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 14.
15. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 15.

3
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16. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 16 and as an affirmative matter
alleges that Defendant is a medical doctor with the ability to provide for the medical needs of
the child and it is contrary to the best interest and welfare of said child to permit Petitioner to
go about in a loose-cannon manner without an agenda of focus and control.
17. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 17.
18. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 18.
19. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 19.
20. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 20.
21. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 21.
22. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 22.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed no cause
of action or in the alternative that this matter be referred to the Juvenile Court for a
determination of whether or not the minor child, concerning whom this Petition is brought, has
become emancipated or is a neglected child under the definitions of the Utah Code.
DATED this £ 5

day of October, 1993.

ROBERT L. MOOD* / 1
Attorney for Defendant ^o

4
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a trae and correct copy of the foregoing Answer,
this ZITaav of October, 1993, postage prepaid to the following:
Rosemund G. Blakelock
Attorney for Plaintiff
37 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, UT 84601

^jtlUtt

da.dhrorce\aiis-bowciitt
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
********

JANET SUE BOWCUTT,
Plaintiff,

RULING
CASE NUMBER:

784448131

vs.
NOVEMBER 24, 1993
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT,

STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE

Defendant.
********

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on November
4, 1993 for an Order To Show Cause hearing.

Helen Jensen,

Guardian and Conservator of the parties' minor child, David
Charles Bowcutt, was present and represented by Rosemond
Blakelock.

Robert L. Moody appeared for the defendant.

On or

about October 27, 1993 Helen Jensen filed an Order To Show Cause
in this matter.

On or about October 29, 1993 defendant filed a

Motion To Dismiss along with a Memorandum In Support Of Motion To
Dismiss.

On or about November 3, 1993 Helen Jensen filed a

Response To Motion To Dismiss Order To Show Cause.

At the

hearing held November 4, 1993, the Court heard discussion
regarding jurisdiction, child support arrearages, and defendant's
on-going child support obligation and took the matter under
advisement.
The Court, having reviewed the above documentation and upon
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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being advised in the premises, now rules as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

A Decree Of Divorce in the above-entitled matter was

signed and entered on March 2, 1978, whereas plaintiff was
awarded custody of the parties' two minor children and defendant
was ordered to pay plaintiff $75.00 per child per month as child
support.

On August 3, 1982 an Order was signed by Judge Allen B.

Sorensen, whereas defendant's child support obligation was
increased to $125.00 per child per month.
On or about June 11, 1992 the State of Utah, Department of
Human Services filed a Petition To Modify on behalf of the
plaintiff, whereas the State of Utah sought to have defendant's
child support obligation for the parties' remaining minor child,
David Charles Bowcutt, increased to $763.00 based upon
allegations that defendant's income had significantly increased
and pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6), there was now more than a
25% difference between the existing support order and what
defendant's support obligation would currently be under the Utah
Uniform Child Support Guidelines.

2.

Janet Bowcutt Wing, the plaintiff in the above-entitled

matter and the custodial parent of David Bowcutt, died on
February 5, 1993.

On or about August 13, 1993 Helen Jensen, the

maternal grandmother of David Bowcutt, filed a Verified Petition
For Appointment Of Guardian And Conservator under Civil Number
933400310.

On September 3, 1993 Helen Jensen and David Bowcutt
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appeared before Judge Guy R. Burningham for a hearing on the
appointment of Guardian and Conservator.

At that time the Court

called for any objections and receiving none granted Helen
Jensen's Petition and executed the order in open court.

On or

about September 9, 1993 David Charles Bowcutt, the minor child in
question, filed an Acceptance Of Appointment Of Guardian And
Conservator.

3.

On or about October 22, 1993 Helen Jensen, as Guardian

and Conservator of the minor child David Charles Bowcutt, filed a
Verified Petition For Child Support And Maintenance under Civil
Number 934402209# seeking both reimbursement of support provided
for David Bowcutt since March 1993 and an order of on-going
support consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines
from the defendant, Don Leslie Bowcutt, who is the minor child's
natural father.
On or about October 29, 1993 defendant filed an Answer in
Civil Case Number 934402209, in which defendant alleges that
Helen Jensen was fraudulently appointed Guardian and Conservator.
Defendant Don Leslie Bowcutt further alleges that David Bowcutt
does not reside with his maternal grandmother, is not attending
school and is working full time, and is either an emancipated
child or is neglected and his custody should be returned to
defendant.

4.

The Court, having reviewed all three court files

dealing with the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, is concerned
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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over both the well-being and status of this minor child.

With

regard to defendant's position that his child support obligation
to the custodial parent was extinguished by the plaintiff's
death, the Court will refer to Faver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275
Utah App. 1990), in which the Utah Court of Appeals held that a
child, via her guardian ad litem, has standing to maintian a
cause of action against her father for support. The Court of
Appeals further stated that:
"Utah courts have long held that the right to receive child
support is an unalienable right, belonging to the child...,11

In Pur fee v. Pur fee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), a case where
the non-custodial parent attempted to extinguish his support
obligation to the custodial parent because the child was residing
with a grandparent during the school year, the Utah Court of
Appeals stated:
,f

Typically, child support payments are made to the custodial
parent because the custodial parent, by reason of physical
custody, incurs the expenses of caring for the child. A
trial court may, however, determine that it is in the best
interest of the child to have support payments made directly
to a third-party care giver during the child's extended
absence. A trial court may, on the other hand, decline to
order payments directly to the third party if it concludes
that the support paid to the custodial parent will likely be
applied to the care of the child during the extended
absence. A trial court therefore has discretion to make
such arrangements as may be required by the circumstances of
a given case to ensure that a child receives the support
ordered.11
See also Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1992),
Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981), Hansen v. Gossett, 590
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1979) (right to support belongs to child), and
State Pivision of Family Services v. Clark. 554 P.2d 1310 (Utah
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1976} (child support duty is continuing and right to receive it
is unalienable)•
In the present matter, the Court finds that the defendant
does have an on-going support obligation to the minor child,
David Charles Bowcutt, and the death of the minor child's
custodial parent has not extinguished that obligation.

Thus, the

Court finds that David Charles Bowcutt does have standing to
maintain an action against his natural father for support via a
guardian ad litem.

Therefore, the Court will appoint Mr. Ron

Wilkinson as Guardian Ad Litem for David Charles Bowcutt, to
represent this minor child's interests and pursue the issue on
what defendant's on-going child support obligation is under the
parties' original divorce case, Civil Number 784448131.

As the

Court believes that defendant's monthly support obligation would
be subject to modification retroactive to the date the State of
Utah originally filed its Petition To Modify as Intervenor on
June 11, 1992, the Court encourages the State of Utah and Mr.
Wilkinson on behalf of David Charles Bowcutt to pursue the
original Petition To Modify pursuant to the requirements of
U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6).

5.

As defendant's on-going support obligation of $125.00

per month was established in the August 3, 1982 Order which has
yet to be modified, the Court orders defendant to deposit that
amount monthly in an interest bearing trust account with either
his own attorney, Mr. Robert Moody, or with Ms. Rosemond
Blakelock, who is representing Helen Jensen.

The Court orders
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defendant and his attorney to submit verification of these
deposits directly to the Court on a monthly basis. Additionally,
the Court orders defendant to submit proof of his current income,
such as a year to date earnings statement and a copy of his 1992
Federal Income Tax Return, for the Court's review.

6.

With regard to the issue of arrearages, the Court heard

testimony at the November 4, 1993 Order To Show Cause hearing
from a Ms. Jeri Ann Brewer of the Office of Recovery Services,
who told the Court that the $6,653.32 arrearage had been
previously reduced to judgement.

The Court believes that Janet

Sue Bowcutt Wing's personal representative should proceed to
collect this judgement on behalf of her estate as any other debt
owing a decedent would be collected pursuant to the Utah Uniform
Probate Code §§75-3-703 and 75-3-708. Therefore, the Court will
grant defendant's Motion To Dismiss as to the issue of the
arrearages which defendant owed to Janet Bowcutt Wing prior to
her death.

7.

Pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-5(3), this Court has

continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
arrangements as is reasonable and necessary and may be required
in any given case to ensure that a minor child receives the
support he or she is entitled to.

Therefore, the Court will set

a special review hearing in the above entitled matter to
determine the status and needs of David Charles Bowcutt as well
as defendant's current income level.

Because the Court is aware
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that a conflict of interest may exist concerning the Court's
appointment of Mr. Ron Wilkinson as David Bowcutt's Guardian Ad
Litem and Mr. Robert Moody's representation of the defendant, the
Court is willing to entertain discussion from all parties and
counsel regarding that issue at the review hearing.

In order to

accommodate all counsel's schedules, the Court will have counsel
contact this office at 429-1008 within ten (10) days of the date
of this ruling to set a time for this review hearing.

cc:

Rosemond Blakelock
Robert Moody
Ron Wilkinson

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

E X H I B I T

I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

m

c. r v ?;

p;« r>: CO

Robert L. Moody, No. 2302
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Defendant
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANET BOWCUT,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES

Plaintiff,
v.
DON LESLIE BOWCUT,
Defendant.

Case K^784448131
9344022D9Tana-9334t)0310
Judge Hansen

:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Plaintiff in Case No. 784448131 died on the 5th day of February, 1993.
2.

Helen Jensen, the maternal grandmother of the Plaintiff, was appointed

guardian and conservator under Civil No. 933400310. An objection to this appointment was
filed by the Defendant, Donald Bowcut.
3. On or about October 22, 1993, Helen Jensen filed a petition for child support
and maintenance under Civil No. 934402209. Defendant filed an answer.
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4. On November 24, 1993, Judge Steven L. Hansen entered a ruling in Case No.
784448131 after considering all three cases and, in addition thereto, made findings of fact and
conclusions of law without the benefit of having any evidence.
5. The minor child, David Charles Bowcut, has a right to be supported.
6. The Defendant, Don Leslie Bowcut, has a duty to support the child.
7. The minor child, David Charles Bowcut, has an entitlement because of his
mother's death to Social Security benefits.
8. The minor child is employed and has earnings of his own.

POINT ONE
ALL CASES SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED.
There are currently three cases pending before the Fourth Judicial District Court
with regard to the rights of the minor, David Charles Bowcut, and the obligations of Don Leslie
Bowcut. In Case No. 784448131, the Plaintiff is deceased. In Case No. 934402209, a duly
appointed guardian has brought an action to enforce support for and in behalf of the minor,
David Charles Bowcut. Don Leslie Bowcut has contested the guardianship of Helen Jensen in
Case No. 933400310.

All of these cases involve the same parties, the same issues, and

consolidation will avoid confusion and unnecessary, multiple litigation.

2
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CONCLUSION
The above-numbered cases should be consolidated to avoid further confusion, to
resolve the issue of who should be guardian for the minor child, David Charles Bowcut, and
how much support should be paid for his best interest and welfare. Consolidation will also
avoid unnecessary confusion on the parts of the litigants, counsel, and the court.
DATED this uj*=> day of January, 1994.

ROBERT L. MOOtyY
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this 20

day of January, 1994, postage prepaid to

the following:
Rosemund G. Blakelock
Attorney for Plaintiff
37 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, UT 84601

da.divorcc\meiii-bowcat.2
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C0tM^^ - •**?
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

J^

********

JANET SUE BOWCUTT,
Plaintiff,

RULING
CASE NUMBER:

784448131

vs.
APRIL 5, 1994
STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE

DON LESLIE BOWCUTT,
Defendant.

********

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 18,
1994 for an evidentiary hearing regarding the defendant's child
support obligation for the parties' minor child, David Charles
Bowcutt.

Helen Jensen, maternal grandmother, Guardian and

Conservator for the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, was
present and represented by Rose Blakelock.
and represented by Robert Moody.

Defendant was present

Ron Wilkinson, Guardian Ad

Litem for David Charles Bowcutt, was also present.

At that time,

the Court heard discussion and testimony regarding defendant's
ability to provide support for the minor child and the minor
child's status and needs for support and took the matter under
advisement.
On December 23, 1993 attorneys Rose Blakelock, Robert Moody,
John Musselman, and Ron Wilkerson appeared before Judge Steve L.
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Hansen for an Order To Show Cause hearing.

At that time, the

Court ordered that a child support order was to be in the file
within thirty days and the order would be retroactive to the
Petition To Modify.

On or about January 18, 1994 defendant filed

a Request For Full Evidentiary Hearing.

On or about January 21,

1994 defendant filed a Motion To Consolidate along with a
Memorandum Of Points And Authorities.

On January 27, 1994 an

Order On Hearing was signed and entered by the Court.

On or

about February 3, 1994 Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator of
David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Motion In Support Defendant's
Motion To Consolidate and a Motion In Support Defendant's Request
For Full Evidentiary Hearing, Request For Information On
Defendant's Income, And Motion For Compliance With Court's Order
Of December 3, 1993.

On or about March 8, 1994 Helen Jensen,

Guardian and Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Notice
To Submit and on March 18, 1994, Mrs. Jensen's counsel filed an
Affidavit In Support Of Attorney's Fees.
The Court, having reviewed the above documentation and the
Court's tape record of the March 18, 1994 hearing, and upon being
advised in the premises, now rules as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

A Decree Of Divorce in the above-entitled matter was

signed and entered on March 2, 1978, whereas plaintiff, Janet
Bowcutt, was awarded custody of the parties' two minor children
and defendant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$75.00 per month per child.

On August 3, 1982 the Court entered

an Order, whereas defendant7s child support obligation was
increased to $125.00 per month per child.
On or about June 11, 1992 the State of Utah, Department of
Human Services filed a Petition To Modify on behalf of plaintiff,
Janet Bowcutt.

At that time the State of Utah sought to increase

defendant's child support obligation from $125.00 per month to
$763.00 pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6).
On February 5, 1993, Janet Bowcutt, plaintiff and custodial
parent of David Charles Bowcutt, died due to suicide.

On or

about August 13, 1993, Helen Jensen, maternal grandmother of
David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Verified Petition For Appointment
Of Guardian And Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt and on
September 3, 1993 Helen Jensen was appointed as David Charles
Bowcutt's Guardian and Conservator by Judge Guy R. Burningham.
This matter came before the Court on November 4, 1993 for an
Order To Show Cause hearing brought by Helen Jensen, Guardian and
Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt, who was seeking child
support from the defendant on behalf of the minor child.

The

Court issued a Ruling on November 24, 1993, whereas the Court
found that defendant did have an on-going support obligation to
David Charles Bowcutt and ordered that defendant place $125.00
per month in an interest bearing trust account pending final
resolution of this matter, that the $6,653,00 child support
arrearage previously reduced to judgement be collected by Janet
Bowcutt Wing's personal representative pursuant to the Utah
Uniform Probate Code, and that a special review hearing be set
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for the limited purpose of determining David Charles Bowcutt7s
status and needs as well determining the defendants present
income.

Additionally, the Court appointed Mr. Ron Wilkerson as

David Charles Bowcutt7s Guardian Ad Litem.

2.

With regard to defendant7s Motion To Consolidate filed

on or about January 21, 1994, the Court agrees that all three
cases, Civil Number 934402209, Civil Number 93400310, and Civil
Number 784448131, in which child support for David Charles
Bowcutt are at issue should be consolidated.

The Court notes

that it previously directed Mr. Ron Wilkerson in the Ruling
issued November 24, 1993 to proceed on this matter under the
parties7 original divorce action, Civil Number 784448131, based
upon the Court7s determination that modification of defendant7s
monthly child support obligation to David Charles Bowcutt would
be retroactive to the date the State of Utah filed its Petition
To Modify As Intervenor on June 11, 1992. For clarification
purposes, the Court consolidates the other two cases into Civil
Number 784448131.

Counsel is directed to file all documents

pertaining to this matter in Civil Number 784448131 pursuant to
the Court7s previous finding that based upon Utah Court of
Appeals7 decision in Faver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 (Utah App.
1990), David Charles Bowcutt, via his Guardian Ad Litem, does
have standing to maintain an action against his natural father
for support.

3,

With regard to a determination of defendant7s present
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income, the Court finds that defendant is a physician who earned
$62,257.26 from his medical practice in 1993 and also earned an
additional $21,845.00 in 1993 from a contract with Utah County
for the provision of medical services to the Utah County Jail for
a total earnings of $84,102.26 in 1993.

See 1993 Miscellaneous

Income Forms of Dr. Don L. Bowcutt.
Defendant maintains that pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(2),
his earnings from his medical practice should be viewed as "one
full-time job11 to be used in calculating his child support
obligation for David Bowcutt and that his earnings resulting from
his contract with Utah County should be treated as over-time
earnings and excluded from calculating gross income for purposes
of determining child support.
Helen Jensen, acting in her capacity as David Bowcutt's
Guardian and Conservator, maintains that defendant, as a medical
doctor is a professional and that all income resulting from his
practice of medicine, regardless of where that practice occurs,
should be utilized by the Court in calculating defendant's child
support obligation to David.
Pursuant to U.C.A §78-45-7(3), the Court in determining the
appropriate amount of support, must consider all relevant
factors, including but not limited to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

the standard of living and situation of the parties;
the relative wealth and income of the parties;
the ability of the obligor to earn;
the ability of the obligee to earn;
the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
the ages of the parties; and
the responsibilities of the obligor and obligee for the
support of others.

The Court, noting that defendant has completed his professional
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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education and developed a medical practice subsequent to the
August 3, 1982 Order which modified his support obligation to
$125.00 per month per child, finds that defendant is engaged in a
medical practice that includes providing his services as a
physician to the Utah County Jail as well as his practice with
Dr. Bell.

The Court, in considering defendant's present income

level, standard of living, and relative wealth as well as the low
level of support that defendant has historically provided for
this minor child, will elect to utilize all of defendant's
earnings resulting from his practice of medicine in determining
defendant's present income level. Therefore, the Court finds
that defendant's average monthly gross income is $7,008.52 based
upon his gross 1993 income of $84,102.26.

($62,257.26 Earnings

From Medical Practice With Carl T. Bell, M.D. + $21,845.00
Earnings From Utah County = $84,102.26 1993 Gross Income).
($84,102.26 1993 Gross Income -^ 12. = $7,008.52 Average Gross
Monthly Income).

4.

With regard to the issue of the needs and status of the

minor child, David Bowcutt, the Court heard testimony from Mrs.
Jensen at the March 18, 1994 hearing as to actual expenses she
has incurred for the care and support of David.

It is

uncontroverted that David has resided with other third parties,
specifically the Tom Prentice family and his sister, Wendy, as
well as Mrs. Jensen during the time period following his mother's
death in February of 1993. Mrs. Jensen testified that she has
paid money to those other third parties that David has
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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periodically resided with for his support, specifically giving
Tom Prentice $1,500.00 in September of 1993 for food and support
provided to David-

While Mrs. Jensen was unable to provide the

Court with detailed information on the exact amount of funds she
has expended in Davids behalf, she estimated that she has
expended approximately between $250.00 and $500.00 per month for
David7s needs, such as food, clothing, medical expenses,
transportation costs, shelter, and other miscellaneous needs.
Additionally, it is uncontroverted that David is currently
receiving $233.00 per month entitlement from Social Security due
to his mothers death.

Mrs. Jensen testified that the Social

Security benefit is deposited directly in David's own bank
account and that he has been using those funds for recreation and
miscellaneous needs. Mrs. Jensen further testifies that she has
had no access to or control over the Social Security entitlement
David receives and that those funds have not been used for
David's care and support.

The Court also heard testimony that

David is not employed as defendant has alleged and has no other
income separate from his Social Security entitlement.
Additionally, the Court heard testimony from the defendant
at the March 18, 1994 hearing as to his belief that monthly
expenses attributable for the care and support of a seventeen
year old boy such as David would be in the range of $500.00 per
month.
Although defendant is financially secure and capable of
providing support for David, he maintains that the Social
Security entitlement David receives should be factored in by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court in determining defendant support obligation-

Pursuant to

U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(8)(a), such benefit to a child in the child's
own right, may not be included in gross income for purposes of
calculating child support.

Thus, the Court will riot offset

defendant's support obligation with the Social Security death
benefits David receives as a result of his mother's death.

5.

The Court, noting that defendant presently has two

minor children with his present spouse for which he provides the
sole support for, will allow defendant credit for his support
obligation for those children.

Thus, the Court will allow

defendant a credit a $1,157.00 for his support obligation to his
younger minor children pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(4)(a),(b),
the Worksheet To Determine Father's Obligation To Children In His
Present Home, and the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Table
set forth in U.C.A. §78-45-7.14.

(See Attachment A ) .

Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6), a difference of at least
25% between the existing child support order and what the child
support obligation would be under the Utah Uniform Child Support
Guidelines utilizing the parties' current incomes constitutes a
material change of circumstances that would justify the Court
modifying an existing child support order.

Thus, based upon

defendant's gross monthly income of $7,008.52 and the $1,157.00
credit for the children in his present home, the Court finds that
a difference of more than 25% does exist between defendant's
existing support obligation and what his support obligation would
be under the present Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
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($596-00 - $125.00 = $471.00 -5- $596.00 = .79%).

Therefore, the

Court will modify defendant's child support obligation for David
Charles Bowcutt to $596.00 per month.

6.

(See Attachment B)•

With regard to the issue of whether the modification of

defendant's child support obligation should be retroactive to the
date the State of Utah filed a Petition To Modify on June 11,
1992 as Intervenor on behalf of the custodial parent, Janet
Bowcutt Wing, who had sought public assistance for the minor
child, the Court will refer to U.C.A. §30-3-10.6(2) which states:
"A child or spousal support payment under a child support
order may be modified with respect to any period during
which a petition for modification is pending, but only from
the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee,
if the obligator is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if
the obligee is the petitioner."
Although the Court would be inclined to make the modification of
defendant's child support obligation retroactive to the date the
State of Utah filed its Petition, the Court notes that no Return
Of Service for defendant was ever filed in this matter, although
plaintiff Janet Bowcutt Wing was served with the State Of Utah's
Petition To Modify and an appropriate Return Of Service was
filed.

However, the Court notes that all parties involved in

this matter, Mrs. Jensen, the defendant, and Mr. Wilkerson, the
Guardian Ad Litem agreed at the March 18, 1994 hearing that any
modification of the child support award should be made
retroactive to the date of the custodial parent's death.
Therefore, based upon that the parties' agreement as to when the
modification of defendant's child support obligation should take
effect presented to the Court at the March 18, 1994 hearing, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court will order the modification retroactive to February 5,
1993, the date of Janet Bowcutt Wing's death.
Defendant is entitled to a credit against child support
arrearages resulting from the retroactive modification for the
$250.00 that he paid directly to Mrs. Jensen in November of 1993
and for the amounts that have been deposited into Mr. Moody's
trust account subsequent to the Court's previous Ruling issued
November 24, 1993. The funds currently being held in Mr. Moody's
trust account are to be turned over to Mrs. Jensen and an
appropriate Judgement for any amounts in arrearage will be
entered against the defendant and awarded to Mrs, Helen Jensen,
Guardian and Conservator for David Charles Bowcutt.

7.

Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals decision in

Purfee v. Purfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), regarding the
trial court's discretion to make such arrangements as may be
required by the circumstances of a given case to ensure that a
child receives the support ordered, the Court will order that
defendant make the child support payment directly to Mrs. Helen
Jensen, Guardian and Conservator for Pavid Charles Bowcutt.
Mrs. Jensen may disperse these funds to herself and other
third parties, such as the Prentice family, with whom Pavid has
been residing with periodically and who are engaged in providing
Pavid with the care and support necessary for a seventeen year
old boy.

The Court further orders Mrs. Jensen to submit to the

Court on a quarterly basis, a detailed accounting of how the
child support award is being expended on Pavid's behalf.
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court ordered to do so, defendant will be responsible for all
costs associated with such therapy for David Bowcutt.

9.

With regard to the issue of an award of attorney fees

and costs in this matter, the Court notes that Mrs. Jensen filed
an Affidavit In Support Of Attorney,s Fees on or about March 18,
1994 and defendant filed an Objection To Affidavit In Support Of
Attorney Fees on or about March 25, 1994.
The Court will refer to Lynale v. Lvnale. 831 P.2d 1027
(Utah App. 1992), in which the Utah Court of Appeals stated that:
"In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree,
an award of attorney fees is based solely upon the trial
court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the
moving party."
In the above-entitled matter, Mrs. Jensen was forced to bring the
defendant before this Court in order to obtain support for
defendant's minor child.

The Court, noting that defendant had

previously taken the position that his support obligation was
extinguished by the death of the custodial parent, believes the
Mrs. Jensen had little choice in bringing this matter before the
Court in order to obtain the support necessary for the minor
child, David Bowcutt.

Thus, upon review of the Affidavit In

Support Of Attorney's Fees filed by Ms. Blakelock on or about
March 18, 1994, the Court will elect to award Mrs. Jensen
$1,000.00 in attorney fees and $105.00 for costs associated in
pursuing this matter.

Appropriate judgement against the

defendant may be entered.
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10.

Counsel for Mrs. Jensen is directed to prepare an

appropriate order consistent with the aforementioned ruling.

DATED at Provo, Utah this

£-

day of April, 1994

BY THE COURT:

cc:

Rosemond Blakelock
Robert Moody
Ron Wilkerson
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ATTACHMENT "B"
FOURTH

IN THE

DISTRICT COURT
. COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH
•1ANM SUE BOWCUTT

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKS
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNTTi

vs.

Gvil No.

DON LESLIE BOWCUTT

784448131
C

L Enter the combined number of natural and adopted children of thismother
and father.
2a, Enter thefactor'sand mother's gross monthly income
Refer to Ihstrucaons for definition of income.
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony thai is aomHypaid.
(Do not enter alimony ordered fbr this case).
2c. Enter previously ordered child support* (Do na enter obligations
ordered for the children in this case).
2d. Optional: Enter the amountfromLine 12 of the Children in Present Home
WcMisiiftcr for either merit.
1 SobcactIine2b^2c>aiid21fiom23L This is tteAdjusred Monthly
Gross for child support pgrocacL
4 . Take the COMBINED

figm»mTm»3?r»ri

/ISO
-0>

*>&

7,008.52
5'tA O $<=>>

ff^imwih^^rfrtftfrwt jij T W

1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support ObSgarioa.
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by ifce COMBINED
adiuscd monthly gross in Line 3.
6. Moitipiy Line 4 by Line 5 fhr each parent © obtain each parents share of
die Base Support Obligation.

-0-

59.6.00

Btatt

g m e r thg ehilrirgn'g pnrriati t%f itmmhJy m*ftir*l smi A*m\ mw-n*'-

\ paid to in mi ancr oinoany,
S. Enter the monthly
or trazmnf relaxed chSd care
the children in Line 1*

fixite

9. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
Bring down the jmuunt in Line 6 6br the Obligor parent.

596.00

UL Adjusted Base Child Support Award
SubcaatbeObfi_qrtIine7ftomLaic9.
1L Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child
Divide Line 10 by Line L
12. CHILD CARE A WARD
Multiply Line S by -50 to obtain obligor's share of child care «pm<r, Add to Line 10 only

**cn w wnrcframallv TCnal

fl^V

®
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IN THE'

FOURTH

DISTRICT COURT

UTAH

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JANET SUE BOWCUTT

vs.

7

Don LESLIE BOWCUTT

"2

J
)
)•
)
)
)

WORKSHEET TO DETERMINE FATHERS
OBUGATIONSTO CHILDREN IN HIS
$
PRESENT HOME

I

:^f^?>°r^Mo,

784448131

D^ e>^)

Current
Spouse

Current S excuse's Name
1. Enter the number of natural and adopted children of the father and
his current spouse in the home.

Father

Combinec

ft^^PSvfevra'iSS3

2a. Enter the father's and his current spouse's gross monthly income.
See instructions for definition of income.

-0-

7,008.52

2b. Enter previously ordered alimony actually paid.
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case).

:^w<i>Sw:i$>^^^

|fe-»*>tt^?:M*w&>x-x«'H5«:

2c. Enter pre-existing ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations
ordered for the children in this case).

IngniH

3. Subtract Line 2b and 2c from Line 2a. This is the Adjusted Monmly
Grossforchild support purposes.

-0-

7,008.52

4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and me number of children in Line
1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support Obligation.

7,008.52
1,157.00

5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED
adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of
the Base Support Obligation.
7. Enter the monthly uninsured medical expenses for the children in l i n e i.
8. Enter the monthly work or trainingrelatedchild care expenses for the
the children in Line 1.
FATHER'S SHARE OF BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD FOR THE CHILDREN IN
LINE L Enter the amount for the fatherfromLine 6.
10. FATHER'S SHARE OF UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES OF THE CHILDREN
IN LINE L Multiply the amount in Line 7 by a proposed ratio, and enter result here.
11. FATHER'S SHARE OF WORK OR TRAINING RELATED CHILD CARE EXPENSE
OF THE CHILDREN IN LINE L Multiply Line 3 by J50, and enterresulthere.
12. FATHER'S SHARE OF TOTAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TO THE
CHILDREN IN LINE L Add Lines 9,10, and 11. This amount may be used to adjust the
father's gross income on the sole, split or joint custody worksheets.
AT

'V

H ^

J

J
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1,157.00
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ROSEMOND BLAKELOCK #6183
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner
37 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, UT 84601
Telephone: (801) 375-7678

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JANET SUE BOWCUTT,
Plaintiff

:
:

ORDER ON RULING:
CHILD SUPPORT

vs.
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT,
Defendant.

:
:
:

Case No. 784448131
Judge Steven L. Hansen

THIS MATTER came before the Court on an Evidentiary Hearing
regarding the Defendant's child support obligation for the parties'
minor child, David Charles Bowcutt.

Helen Jensen, maternal

grandmother, Guardian and Conservator for the minor child, David
Charles Bowcutt, was present and represented by Rosemond Blakelock.
Defendant was present and represented by Robert Moody.

Ron

Wilkerson, Guardian Ad Litem for David Charles Bowcutt, was

also

present.

At that time the court heard discussion and testimony

regarding the Defendant's ability to provide support for the minor
child and the minor child's status and needs for support and took
the matter under advisement.
Subsequently, the Court having reviewed the documentation,
considered all the evidence, and being fully advised
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in the

premises, issued Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law.
Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law,
the Court makes the following:

ORDER

1.

The

934402209,

Court
Case

orders

Number

the

consolidation

93440310

and

Case

of

case

Number

number

784448131

consolidated into one number, Case Number 784448131. All documents
pertaining to this matter are to be filed under case Number
784448131.
2.

The Court shall not offset the Defendant's support

obligation with the Social Security death benefits the minor child
David receives as a result of his mother's' death.
3. Based

upon the Defendant's

gross

monthly

income of

$7,008.52, and allowing a credit for the Defendant's obligations to
children

in

his

present

home, the

Court

shall

modify

the

Defendant's child support obligation for David Charles Bowcutt to
$596.00 per month, retroactive to February 5, 1993, the date of
Janet Bowctt Wings's death.
4. Defendant shall be entitled to a credit against child
support arrearages resulting from the retroactive modification for
the $250.00 that was paid directly to Mrs. Jensen in November,
1993, and credit for any amounts deposited into Mr. Moody's trust
account subsequent to the Court's November 24, 1993 Ruling.
5. The funds held in Mr. Moody's trust account shall be turned
over to Mrs. Jensen.
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6. A Judgment shall be entered for the amount of $8,940.00
($596 per month from

February, 1993 through April, 1994) minus

credit for $250.00 and a credit for the amount held in Mr. Moody's
trust account.
7. Future child support payments shall be made directly to
Mrs. Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator for David Charles
Bowcutt.
8. Mrs. Jensen shall disperse these funds to herself and other
third parties, such as the Prentice family, with whom David has
been residing periodically and who are engaged in providing David
with care and support.
9. Mrs. Jensen shall submit to the Court on a quarterly basis,
a detailed accounting of how the child support award is being
expended on David's behalf.

The first report due in August, 1994

for the period of May through July, 1994.
10. The child support funds shall not be turned over directly
to David for his use at his discretion.

If the funds are not used

for ongoing support needs, they may be turned over to David upon
his majority.
11. Defendant shall be responsible for all costs associated
with any therapy needs for David Bowcutt.
12. Helen Jensen is awarded a judgment against the Defendant
in the amount of $1,000.00 in attorney's fees and $105 in costs.
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13. Judgment may be entered against Defendant for $1,105.00,
for attorney's fees and costs.

DATED AND EFFECTIVE this

a

day of

AA^H

., 1994

BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM

SkMMU4r

Robert Mood

4-504 NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY
TO: Robert Moody;
You will please take notice that he undersigned attorney for
Petitioner will submit the above and foregoing Order to the Court,
for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of
this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written
objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of
the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah.
DATED this

1994.

*OSEMOND G.CBLAKELOCK
Attorney for Petitioner
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Don Leslie Bowcut
1130 West State Road
Pleasant Grove, UT
Telephone: (801) 785-7804

'. •!»•!

? 1 p'j i.r.,

K

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO APPEAL
ORDER ON RULING:
CHILD SUPPORT.

JANET BOWCUT,
Plaintiff,
v.

.i*

DON LESLIE BOWCUT,

M

Case No. 784448131
Judge Hansen

Defendant.
COMES NOW the Defendant and hereby moves to appeal the
above-entitled matter on the grounds and reasons set forth in the
accompanying Affidavit.
DATED this /O

day of June, 1994.

t ^

5

^

DON LESLIE^)e0WCUT
Acting in Pro Se

1
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Don Leslie Bowcut
1130 West State Road
Pleasant Grove, UT
Telephone: (801) 785-7804

"K

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANET BOWCUT,
Plaintiff/

:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO APPEAL
ORDER ON RULING:
CHILD SUPPORT.

:

<\
<<

DON LESLIE BOWCUT,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 784448131
Judge Hansen

:
UNDISPUTED FACTS

1. The Plaintiff died on the 5th day of February 1993.
2. Any and all claims that the Plaintiff had against the
Defendant were extinguished by the death of the Plaintiff.
3. Upon the death of the Plaintiff# the Defendant became the
minor child David C. Bowcut's only surviving parent and gained
sole custody.

l
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POINT ONE
In the ruling of CASE NUMBER 784448131, dated November 1993,
Judge Hansen mentioned Civil Case Number 934402209 in which the
defendant alleges that Helen Jensen was fraudulently appointed
Guardian and conservator of minor child David C. Bowcut. Judge
Hansen never made a ruling as to whether or not the motion to
reverse Guardian and conservatorship would be granted.
On September 3, 1993, Helen Jensen was granted Guardian and
Conservator of David C. Bowcut. Previous to that date, she had
no grounds to receive any child support. The ruling made by
Judge Hansen of making the child support retroactive from the
date of the mother's death was in error, as Mrs. Jensen had
neither physical nor legal custody of the child for the majority
of that time.
On April 5, 1994, Helen Jensen stated that the minor child
David C. Bowcut was not attending school, he is using alcohol and
possibly drugs. She also stated that she npr any family member
had any control over the minor child.

The Defendant alleges that

this situation is not a good environment for the minor child and
in the best interest of the child, he should be placed with his
father.

Further, any claims toward child support made by Helen

Jensen should be denied because she was not supplying guidance
and supervision for the child as verbally contracted.

2
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POINT TWO
Relevant factors were not considered when calculating the
income of the defendant.

The court found that the defendant is a

physician who earns $62,257.26 from his medical practice and
earns and additional $21,845 from a contract with the Utah County
for provision of medical services to the Utah County Jail for a
total earning of $84,102.26. This calculation did not take into
consideration that in order to command such a salary, tremendous
educational loans were necessary.

Dr. Bowcut has outstanding

school loan obligation of $1200.00 per month which reduces his
spendable income by that same amount.

In setting up a medical

practice, Dr. Bowcut also pays small business taxes which results
in a large reduction of his spendable income.

Therefore, the

contract with Utah County should not be considered for
calculation in the child support

POINT THREE
In the "Child Support Obligation Worksheet (Sole Custody And
Paternity)11, no amount of obligation for the mother was
calculated.

The minor child is receiving

$233.00 entitlement

for Social Security due to his mother's death.

Judge Hansen made

it clear that he did not want those monies simply given to David
to spend as he wishes and that it should go toward his support.
This amount should be included as support for the minor child.

3
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POINT FOUR
The attorney, Mr. Robert Moody did not address the
issues that the Defendant Dr. Bowcut desired.

Mr. Moody defended

on the grounds of lowering the child support to the necessary
amount.

Dr. Bowcut wanted the custody returned to him so that he

could supervise the minor child.

POINT FIVE
The Defendant objects to the order to pay the plaintiffs
attorney fees.

The Defendant alleges that the court case should

have never taken place. The Defendant told the Plaintiff
repeatedly that when the minor child David C

Bowcut stayed at

one house 30 days, he would send money to that individual. Had
she maintained some level of control over the child—kept him in
school and coming home at night—as agreed prior to guardianship
transfer, she would have been fully compensated.

Upon sending

the first payment, Helen Jensen filed the court case.

DATED this

/A

day of June, 1994.

DON LES:
BOWCUT
Acting in Pro Se

4
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C E R T I F I C A T E

O F

M A I L I N G

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the forgoing Motion to Correct Order on Ruling: Child Support,
this /?o day of June, 1994, postage prepaid to the following:
Roseinund G. Blakelock
Attorney for Plaintiff
37 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, UT 84601
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ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK #6183
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A.
Attorney for Plaintiff
37 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, UT 84606
Telephone: (801) 375-7678
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601
JANET BOWCUTT,
Plaintiff,
VS.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

MOTION FOR
STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS
AND NOTION FOR JOINT (ONE)
DECISION BY JUDGES BURNINGHAM
AND HANSEN

*

DON LESLIE BOWCUTT,
Defendant

*
Case No. 93340310
* (consolidated into #784448131)
*
Judge Guy Burningham
*
and Judge Steven Hansen

COMES NOW Helen Jensen, by and through her counsel, Rosemond
Blakelock and pursuant to Rule 62, of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, moves the court, Judges Hansen and Burningham, for an
Order Staying All Further Proceedings, in the Fourth District
Court, on the grounds and for the reasons that there is an appeal
before the Utah Court Of Appeals, Case Number 940361-CA, which
deals with the «sa™=> IRSHPS and requests the same relief as is now
before the court by way of a "MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT:
ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR" (Judge Burningham) and
a "MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGEMENT: NOVEMBER 24, 1993 RULING",
(Judge Hansen).
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Further, this Motion requests that Judge Hansen and Judge
Burningham issue one order which stays the proceedings because the
case has been consolidated

into case number

#784448131.

In

addition, because the two motions filed with the Fourth District
Court are also before the court of Appeals as one appeal, it would
serve the interests of justice for all parties, all judges, and all
court systems to be aware of the numerous pleadings and relief
being presented to the court.
All

of these matters are more fully

set

forth

in the

accompanying Memorandum.

DATED AND SIGNED this 5th day of August, 1994.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correctr copy of
foregoing Motion and accompanying Memorandum in Support to
Leslie Bowcutt, 1130 West State Road, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and
Wilkinson, 1139 South Orem Blvd., Orem, Utah 84057, on this
day of August, 1994.
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the
Don
Ron
5th

ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK #6183
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A.
Attorney for Plaintiff
37 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, UT 84606
Telephone: (801) 375-7678
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601
*

JANET BOWCUTT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DON LESLIE BOWCUTT,
Defendant

*
*

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR
*
STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS
*
AND MOTION FOR JOINT (ONE)
*
DECISION BY JUDGES BURNINGHAM
*
*
AND HANSEN
*
Case No. 93340310
(consolidated into #784448131)
*
Judge Guy Burningham
*
and Judge Steven Hansen

COMES NOW Helen Jensen, by and through her counsel, Rosemond
Blakelock and as for Memorandum in Support of Motion For Stay of
Proceedings submits the following:
(please

note

this

Memorandum

is

meant

Defendant's Motions, because there now

to

address

both

of

one case, #784448131.

However, two separate Motions have been submitted as well as two
copies of this Memorandum, one for Judge Hansen and one for Judge
Burningham)•
1
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FACTS
1. On September 3, 1993, Judge Guy Burningham signed an
Order

Appointing

Guardian

And

Conservator,

appointing

Helen

Jensen the Guardian of minor child David Bowcutt.
2. On or about October 27, 1993, an Order to Show Cause was
filed in Fourth District Court by Helen Jensen, Guardian and
Conservator of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, regarding
the issue of child support.
3. On November 4, 1993 an Order To Show Cause hearing was
held before Judge Steven Hansen, regarding the issue of child
support.

Robert Moody, appeared for the Appellant, Don Leslie

Bowcutt.
4. On or about October 27, 1993, the Appellant, through
counsel, filed a Motion To Dismiss the Order To Show Cause, along
with a Memorandum in Support thereof.
5.

Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator, filed a Response

to Motion To Dismiss Order To Show Cause on November 4, 1993.
6.
Cause,

On November 4, 1994, at a Hearing on the Order To Show
the

Court

took

argument

from

counsel,

regarding

jurisdiction, child support arrearages and Appellant's on-going
child support obligation and took the matter under advisement.
7.

On November 24, 1994, the honorable Judge Steven L.

Hansen, issued a Ruling regarding the issues of on-going child
2
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support, and jurisdiction.
8.

On November 24, 1993, the Court found that the Appellant

had an on-going support obligation to the minor child.
9. On November 24, 1993/ the Court found that minor child,
David Charles Bowcutt, did have standing to maintain an action
against his natural father for support, via a Guardian Ad Litem,
and Ron Wilkinson, was appointed as Guardian Ad Litem.
10.

On November 24, 1993, with regard to jurisdiction, the

court found that the court has continuing jurisdiction to make an
award of child support, pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(3).
11. The court ordered a special review hearing to "determine
the status and needs of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt,
as well as Defendant#s [Appellant's] current income level."
12.

On December 23, 1993, the hearing was held before Judge

Hansen, regarding the status of the case and the Appellant's
financial status for purposes of establishing the amount of child
support.

Appearing at the hearing held December 23, 1993, the

Appellant's counsel made a request for an Evidentiary Hearing,
regarding only the amount of the child support, not whether there
should be child support.
13. No appeal was filed regarding the court's decision to
conduct an Evidentiary Hearing to establish the amount of child
support obligation of the Appellant.
14.

On March 21, 1994, an Evidentiary Hearing was held,

regarding the sole

issue of the amount
3

of Appellants
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child

support obligation for the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt.
15. The minor child was not present

in court, but was

represented by his Guardian Ad Litem, Ron Wilkinson.
16. The minor child's maternal grandmother, and Guardian and
Conservator, Helen Jensen, was also present, with her counsel,
Rosemond Blakelock.
17. The Trial
argument

and

Court, at the Evidentiary Hearing, heard

testimony

regarding

the Appellant's

ability

to

provide support for the minor child, David Bowcutt, and the said
minor child's need for on-going support.
18. The Trial Court then took the matter of the amount of
child support under advisement, and on or about April 5, 1994,
made a Ruling, issuing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
concerning the amount of child support to be assessed.
19.

Appellant, either personally or through counsel, made a

general appearance at all hearings,

provided testimony to the

court regarding his opinion as to the monthly expenses and needs
of his minor child, David Bowcutt, and in all other matters
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, without
objection.
20. On the 13th day of May, 1994, Judge Hansen issued the
Ruling establishing the amount of the child support, from which
Ruling the Appellant appeals.
21. The Defendant then filed A Notice of Appeal, on or about
the 10th of June, 1994, which requested the matter be decided by
4
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the Utah Court of Appeals.
22. The case is presently pending in the Utah Court of
Appeals, as CASE NO. 940351-CA.

See attachment A, Docketing

Statement.
23. Defendant then

(In the Court of Appeals) requested

Summary Disposition on his appeal with the Appeals court, which
was denied, and the case is proceeding in the court of Appeals.
27. Defendant now has a date certain in which he is to
submit his "Brief11 to the Utah Court of Appeals, regarding his
request for relief from the November 24, 1993 Ruling.
28.

Defendant

has

now

filed

two

separate

Rule

60

(b)

actions, requesting the same relief which is now at issue before
the Appeals Court.
29. Defendant's Rule 60 (b) motion requesting relief from
judgment from the Order Appointing Guardian And Conservator is
"ISSUE THREE",

and

"ISSUE ONE"

in Defendant's

Docketing

Statement, in case number 940361-CA, before the Court of Appeals.
30.

Defendant's Rule 60 (b) motion requesting relief from

judgment from the November

24, 1993 Ruling request the same

relief and present the same issues as "ISSUE TWO" in
Docketing Statement, in

Defendant's

case number 940361-CA, before the Court

of Appeals.

5
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
ARGUMENT
I.
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT MAY GRANT A
STAY UNTIL THE MATTER IS HEARD ON IT'S
MERITS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Defendant has a case pending at this time in the Utah
Court of Appeals dealing with the same issues, and requesting the
same relief, which he now brings before the Fourth District
Court, with Rule 60 (b) Motions.
In the Defendant's Docketing Statement, (attached) page 3,
#7, "ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW" the defendant
appeals

the

appointment

of

Helen

Jensen

as

Guardian

and

Conservator.
In the Defendant's Docketing Statement, page 3# #7, "ISSUE
FOR

REVIEW

AND

STANDARD

OF

REVIEW"

the

defendant

appeals

jurisdiction, which is Issue Two in the Defendant's Docketing
Statement.
In Lewis v. Moultreer 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981), the Court
held that in such circumstances, a stay

is the appropriate

remedy:
It lies within the inherent powers of the courts to
grant a stay of proceedings.
It is a discretionary
power, and the grounds therefor necessarily vary
according to the requirements of each individual case*
A common ground for a stay is the pendency of another
action involving identical parties and issues and where
6
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a decision in one action settles the issues in another,
or when the decision in an action is essential to the
decision in another.2. 1 Am.Jur.2d, Actions, § 92, et
seq.; see also, Power Train, Inc. v. Stuver, Utah, 550
P.2d 1293 (1976).
In the instant case, the case (940361-CA) in the Court of
Appeals involves the identical parties and issues and further,
and even more critical, the decision by the Court of Appeals will
"settle"

the issues which the Defendant brings to the court at

this time.
It was the Defendant who chose to file an appeal with the
Utah Court of Appeals and he cannot now go "forum shopping" in an
attempt to reach a desired resolution in the Fourth District
Court.
The

Defendant

now

has

two

courts

(Appeals

and

Fourth

District) addressing the same issues. In addition, there are two
different judges from the Fourth District Court, that is Judge
Hansen and Judge Burningham, who have been asked to rule on an
issue now before the Court of Appeals.

Should the matter be

permitted to go forward, it would be a procedural impossibility
to sort out the mess when three different decisions (Utah Court
of Appeals, Judge Hansen's and Judge Burningham's) decisions were
issued, all regarding the

same issues and

same request for

relief.

7
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CONCLUSION
Because the Defendant has an appeal pending with the Utah
Court of Appeals which deals with the same individuals, the same
issues and the same request for relief, the Fourth District
Court, (Judges Hansen and Burningham) should issue a stay of the
proceedings until the Court of Appeals decides the case on it's
merits.

,•7
DATED this

^

day of

h/-uJ r/ V^ 1994,

-~?
) t ^ ^

^-£^*

Rosamond G. Blakeloc
Counsel for the Hele

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correctr copy of
the foregoing Motion and accompanying Memorandum in Support to
Don Leslie Bowcutt, 1130 West State Road, Pleasant Grove, Utah,
and Ron Wilkinson, 1139 South Orem Blvd., Orem, Utah 84057, on
this 5th day of August, 1994
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Don Leslie Bowcut
1130 West State Road
Pleasant Grove, UT
Telephone: (801) 785-7804

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ANSWER TO MOTION FOR
STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS
AND MOTION FOR JOINT (ONE)
DECISION BY JUDGES BURNINGHAM
AND HANSEN
AND REQUEST FOR FINAL RULING
Case No. 93340310
(consolidated into #784448131)
Judge Guy Burningham
and Judge Steven Hansen

JANET BOWCUT,
Plaintiff,
v.
DON LESLIE BOWCUT,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant in response to the Plaintiff's Motion For
Stay of All Proceedings and Motion For Joint Decision by Judges
Burningham and Hansen.

He further formally requests a ruling on

both Motion For Relief From Judgement: Order Appointing Guardian
and Conservator and Motion For Relief From Judgment: November 24r
1993 Ruling filed by the defendant on July 26, 1994.

MOTION FOR STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS
The Defendant begs the court to consider and rule on both of
his previously filed Motions For Relief of Judgment.

Contrary to

Plaintiff's counsel's accusations of "forum shopping", the
Defendant has filed for relief under rule 60(b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure in an effort to bring the matter before a court
that the Plaintiff and her counsel will accept as having
1
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jurisdiction over this matter.

The Defendant would have been

happy to leave the matter at the Appellate Court level but the
Plaintiff in her Memorandum In Response To Request For Summary
Disposition And Memorandum In Support Of Appellee's Motion To
Affirm And Motion For Sanctions page 8 (on file with this court)
states that the Court of Appeals was not the proper forum to
raise these two earlier issues because the 30-day rule had
elapsed.

"While the Appellant might appeal the subsequent

ruling, as to the amount of support, the issues of jurisdiction
is Res Judicata."

The defendant then petitioned the Court Of

Appeals for an Extraordinary Writ on both matters but was sent
back to the trial court to seek relief under rule 60(b). The
Plaintiff would have the Courts believe that no forum is proper.
It is interesting to note that at neither the trial court
level nor the appellate court level has the Plaintiff and her
counsel ever disputed the defendant's claim that Mrs. Jensen was
illegally placed as guardian and jurisdiction improper.

Instead,

Plaintiff has always chosen to argue that the forum is improper.
Defendant maintains that Utah law not only allows for relief in
cases of violation of constitutional rights or improper
jurisdiction, but insists that it will be given at some level of
the judicial system.
Regarding the Trial Court's jurisdiction to relieve a party
of a judgment even though it may be a final judgment in appeal
the defendant cites White v State 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990):
the trial court has jurisdiction to consider a rule
60(b) motion after an appeal has been filed and also
2
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has power to deny it. But if the motion has merit, the
trial court must so advise the appellate court, and
the moving party may then request a remand.
and Baker v Western Sur. Co. 757 P.2d 878 (Utah 1988):
We, therefore adopt the position adopted by a majority
courts in recent years that the trial court has
jurisdiction to consider a 60(b) motion while an appeal
is pending. That approach allows the trial court,
which is in a better position to recognize a frivolous
60(b) motion, to evaluate the merits of the motion more
quickly, and may avoid unnecessary appeals.—We
further hold if the district court finds the motion to
be without merit, it may enter an order denying the
motion, and the parties may appeal from that order.
If, however, the trial court is inclined to grant the
motion, counsel should obtain a brief memorandum to
that affect from the trial court, and request an order
of remand from the appellate court so that the trial
court can enter an order. Further, we are optimistic
that district courts, especially when the pendency of
an appeal is brought to their attention, can be
expected to act promptly on most 60(b) motions.
The Plaintiff holds that the defendant has two courts
dealing with identical issues yet claims to the appeals court
that it has no jurisdiction to act on the two orders from which
relief is being sought and that only the amount of support can be
appealed at this date. Thus she holds that that avenue of relief
has been closed.

According to this logic the only avenue of

relief left open lies with rule 60(b).
While it is true that relief from either judgment will
likely render the subsequent May 13, 1994 Order void, common
sense would indicate that relief, if possible, at the trial court
level should precede a possibly lengthy and costly appeal. If
relief is granted from either motion, the defendant will then
request an Order Of Remand from the appellate court.
3
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MOTION FOR JOINT DECISION BY JUDGES
The Defendant objects to the Plaintiff's motion for joint
decisions from Judges Burningham and Hansen on the grounds that
while these cases were eventually consolidated they were separate
at the time of each individual ruling.

Plaintiff's counsel has

tried to muddy the water with claims that independent relief
would cause a "procedural impossibility" when in actuality relief
from either judgment would simply then be taken to the Appeals
Court in request for an Order of Remand and most likely render
the appeal moot. While a lengthy appeal and costly attorney fees
may be considered appealing to Plaintiff's counsel, Defendant
holds that the most expeditious route would best serve the
Plaintiff, Defendant# and minor child.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant holds that the Plaintiff's counsel's
description of his actions subsequent to the orders from which
relief is being sought inaccurately portrays the purpose of the
evidentiary hearing and the Defendant's acceptance of
jurisdiction.

But to argue these issues which transpired after

the orders from which relief is sought seems contrary to the
intent of the law under Rule 60(b).

The Defendant maintains that

even if he had accepted jurisdiction subsequently (which he
hadn't), the order would still be void under Utah law and even
if# as Plaintiff's counsel claims, the matter of guardianship was
never contested until appeal (which it was on several occasions),
4
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the appointment still breached his constitutionally protected
rights.
The Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court have
already decided on these very issues in very similar cases such
as Nielson v Nielson 826 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1991), In re O'Hare's
Guardianship 341 P.2d 205 (Utah 1959), and In re J.P. 341 P.2d
205 (Utah 1982).
Also the Utah Court of Appeals has reviewed the issues
raised in these motions and has sent the defendant back to the
Trial court under Rule 60(b).

To then stay a decision until the

court of Appeals goes through full plenary presentation and
ruling would be contrary to the higher courts intention.

By

ruling on the separate motions for relief at this time, the trial
court would allow the defendant to enter appeals from both orders
and have all issues resolved a the appellate level.

Otherwise

the Appeals Court may have to look at these issues twice.
The Utah Supreme court has clearly stated that the Trial
Court has no choice in this matter State of Utah Department of
Social Services v Vigil 784 P.2d 1130:
However when a motion to vacate a judgment is
based on an claim of lack of jurisdiction,
the district court has no discretion: if
jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot
stand without denying due process to the one
against whom it runs.
The Defendant can show that his constitutional right to due
process was violated by the appointment of guardianship without
the termination of his parental rights, and that the November 24,
5
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1993 Ruling is void because of lack of jurisdiction over the
parties.

He is therefore entitled to relief from judgment and

such an order should render forth.
The Defendant hereby requests that the court separately rule
on MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT: ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN AND
CONSERVATOR and MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT: NOVEMBER 24,
1993 RULING.

DATED this (0^

day of August, 1994,

DON LESLIE BOWCUT
ActingViia Pro Se
C E R T X F X C A T E

O F

M A X 31.11ST C

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the forgoing ANSWER TO MOTION FOR STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS AND
MOTION FOR JOINT (ONE) DECISION BY JUDGES BURNINGHAM AND HANSEN
AND REQUEST FOR FINAL RULING, this 10^ day of August, 1994,
postage prepaid to the following:
Rosemund G. Blakelock
Attorney for Plaintiff
37 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, UT 84601
Ron Wilkinson
1139 South Orem Blvd.
Orem, UT 840'
O^M^l
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78-3M02, Judicial proces
or incompetent -

B-3c-4. Disclosure of confidential communications.
The confidential communication between a victim and a sexual assault
mnselor is available to a third person only when:
(1) the victim is a minor and the counselor believes it is in the best
interest of the victim to disclose the confidential communication to the
victim's parents;
(2) the victim is a minor and the minor's parents or guardian have
consented to disclosure of the confidential communication to a third party
based upon representations made by the counselor that it is in the best
interest of the minor victim to make such disclosure;
(3) the victim is not a minor, has given consent, and the counselor
believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish the desired result of
counseling; or
(4) the counselor has an obligation under Title 62A, Chapter 4, to report information transmitted in the confidential communication.
History: C. 1953, 7 ^ c - 4 , enacted by L.
1983, ch. 158, § 1; L. 1984, ch. 17, § 1; 1992,
Ch

^endme 4 nt Notes. -

ment, effective April 27, 1992, substituted the
reference to Title 62A, Chapter 4, for "Chapter
3b, Title 78" in Subsection (4).

(1) This chapter provides a judi(
severance of the parent-child rela^
and interests of all parties concen
the state.
(2) Wherever possible family life
if a parent is found, by reason o
incompetent based upon any of th
part, the court shall then consider
paramount importance in determii
shall be ordered.
History: C. 1953, 78-3M02, enacted b
1992, ch. 221, § 5.

78-3M03. Definitions.

The 1992 amend-

CHAPTER 3f
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Section
78-3M01.
7$-3f-102.
78-3M03.
78-3M04.
78-3f-105.
78-3f-106.
78-3M07.
78-3f-108.

Short title.
Judicial process for termination
— Parent unfit or incompetent — Best interest of child.
Definitions.
Petition — Who may file.
Contents of petition.
Notice — Nature of proceedings.
Grounds for termination of parental rights.
Evidence of grounds for termination.

78-3f-101.

Section
78-3f-109.
78-3M10.
78-3f-lll.
78-3M12.
78-3f-113.
78-3f-114.

Specific considerations where
child is not in physical custody of parent.
Specific considerations where a
child has been placed in foster home.
Court disposition of child upon
termination.
Review following termination.
Effect of decree.
Voluntary relinquishment —
Irrevocable.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Division" means the 1
partment of Human Service
(2) "Failure of parental a
are unable or unwilling with
the circumstances, conduct,
child outside of their home,
efforts made by the Division
home.
(3) "Plan" means a writte
who has been removed fro
Division of Family Services
upon the parents directly
objective of reuniting the i
comply with the terms and
for adoption.
History: C. 1953, 78-3M03, enacte<
1992, ch. 221, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, c
§ 19 makes the act effective on July

78-3M04. Petition — ^

Short title.

This chapter shall be known as the "Termination of Parental Rights Act.
History: C. 1953, M M , enacted by I .
1992, ch. 221, § 4.

Effective D a . , ^ J - J J - *

f

St.
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(1) The following persons or
the parent-child relationship
division:
(a) the division;
(b) the child's guardiai
(c) a parent, blood reh
(d) the child's foster ps
pursue adoption and has 1
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[ential communications.
tween a victim and a sexual assault
on only when:
ie counselor believes it is in the best
he confidential communication to the

78-3f-l<

78-3M02. Judicial process for termination — Parent unf
or incompetent — Best interest of child.

be minor's parents or guardian have
lential communication to a third party
>y the counselor that it is in the best
ake such disclosure;
ias given consent, and the counselor
V to accomplish the desired result of

(1) This chapter provides a judicial process for voluntary and involuntai
severance of the parent-child relationship, designed to safeguard the rlgh
and interests of all parties concerned and promote their welfare and that
the state.
(2) Wherever possible family life should be strengthened and preserved, bi
if a parent is found, by reason of his conduct or condition, to be unfit <
incompetent based upon any of the grounds for termination described in th
part, the court shall then consider the welfare and best interest of the child
paramount importance in determining whether termination of parental righ
shall be ordered.

an under Title 62A, Chapter 4, to reie confidential communication.

History. C. 1953, 78-3M02, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 5.

ment, effective April 27, 1992, substituted the
reference to Title 62A, Chapter 4, for "Chapter
3b, Title 78" in Subsection (4).

78-3f-103. Definitions.

ER 3f
ARENTAL RIGHTS
Section*
r
8-3f-109.
8-3f-110.
8-3f-lll.
8-3f-112.
8-3f-113.
B-3f-114.

Specific considerations where
child is not in physical custody of parent.
Specific considerations where a
child has been placed in foster home.
Court disposition of child upon
termination.
Review following termination.
Effect of decree.
Voluntary relinquishment —
Irrevocable.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 22
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 199

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Division" means the Division of Family Services within the D
partment of Human Services.
(2) "Failure of parental adjustment" means that a parent or paren
are unable or unwilling within a reasonable time to substantially cone
the circumstances, conduct, or conditions that led to placement of the
child outside of their home, notwithstanding reasonable and approprial
efforts made by the Division of Family Services to return the child to thi
home.
(3) "Plan" means a written agreement between the parents of a chil
who has been removed from his home by the juvenile court, and! tl
Division of Family Services or written conditions and obligations impos<
upon the parents directly by the juvenile court, that have a prima]
objective of reuniting the family or, if the parents neglect or refuse
comply with the terms and conditions of the case plan, freeing the chi
for adoption.
History: C. 1953, 78-3M03, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

Cross-References. Services, § 62A-4-104.

Division of Fami

srmination of Parental Rights Act."

78-3M04. Petition — Who may file.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

(1) The following persons or entities may file a petition for termination
the parent-child relationship with regard to a child in the custody of tl
division:
(a) the division;
(b) the child's guardian ad litem;
(c) a parent, blood relative, or adoptive relative of the child; or
(d) the child's foster parent, so long as that foster parent intends
pursue adoption and has had physical custody of the child for one year
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longer. A foster parent does not lose standing to file a petition under this
section solely because the division removes the child from that home.
(2) The division may request either the attorney general or an appropriate
county attorney or district attorney to file a petition for termination of parental rights under this part.
History: C. 1953, 78-3M04, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 7; 1993, ch. 38, § 113.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or dis-

trict attorney" near the middle of Subsection
(2).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

conduct or condition, to be unfit or
for termination described in this }
fare and best interest of the chil<
whether termination of parental
(4) Any hearing held pursuant
without admittance of any person
ceeding, unless the court determi
will not be detrimental to the c.
History: C. 1953, 78-3M06, enacted I
1992, ch. 221, § 9.

78-3M05. Contents of petition.
(1) The petition for termination of parental rights shall include, to the best
information or belief of the petitioner:
(a) the name and place of residence of the petitioner;
(b) the name, sex, date and place of birth, and residence of the child;
(c) the relationship of the petitioner to the child;
(d) the names, addresses, and dates of birth of the parents, if known;
(e) the name and address of the person having legal custody or guardianship, or acting in loco parentis to the child, or the organization or
agency having legal custody or providing care for the child;
(f) the grounds on which termination of parental rights is sought, in
accordance with Section 78-3f»107; and
(g) the names and addresses of the persons or the authorized agency to
whom legal custody or guardianship of the child might be transferred.
(2) A copy of any relinquishment or consent, if any, previously executed by
the parent or parents shall be attached to the petition.
History: C. 1953, 78-3M05, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 8.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

78-3f-106. Notice — Nature of proceedings.
(1) After a petition for termination of parental rights has been filed, notice
of that fact and of the time and place of the hearing shall be provided, in
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to the parents, the guardian, the person or agency having legal custody of the child, and to any person
acting in loco parentis to the child.
(2) A hearing shall be held specifically on the question of termination of
parental rights no sooner than ten days after service of summons is complete.
A verbatim record of the proceedings shall be taken and the parties shall be
advised of their right to counsel. The summons shall contain a statement to
the effect that the rights of the parent or parents are proposed to be permanently terminated in the proceedings. That statement may be contained in the
summons originally issued in the proceeding or in a separate summons subsequently issued.
(3) The proceedings are civil in nature and are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. The court shall in all cases require the petitioner to establish the facts by clear and convincing evidence, and shall give full and careful
consideration to all of the evidence presented with regard to the constitutional
rights and claims of the parent and, if a parent is found, by reason of his

78-3M07. Grounds for t
The court may terminate all p
parents if it finds any one of tt
(1) that the parent or pai
(2) that the parent or pai
(3) that the parent or pai
(4) that the child is being <
the supervision of the court
responsible agency has made
vices and that either of the
(a) the child has been
tive total period of one y<
parent has substantially
circumstances that caus<
or
(b) the child has beer
tive total period of two
the parent has been una
that cause the child to
substantial likelihood tl
ing proper and effectiv
(5) failure of parental ac
(6) that only token effort
(a) to support or cor
(b) to prevent negle<
(c) to eliminate the i
abuse of the child; or
(d) to avoid being a
(7) the parent or parents
rights to the child, and the
best interest; or
(8) the parent or parents
was returned to live in his
repeatedly refused or faile
protection.
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se standing to file a petition under this
n removes the child from that home,
the attorney general or an appropriate
Sle a petition for termination of parentrict attorney" near the middle of Subsection
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

conduct or condition, to be unfit or incompetent based upon any of the grounc
for termination described in this part, the court shall then consider the we
fare and best interest of the child of paramount importance in determinin
whether termination of parental rights shall be ordered.
(4) Any hearing held pursuant to this part shall be held in closed com
without admittance of any person who is not necessary to the action or pn
ceeding, unless the court determines that holding the hearing in open com
will not be detrimental to the child.
History: C. 1953, 78-3M06, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 9.

>n.

78-3f-l(

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 22!
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992

rental rights shall include, to the best

78-3f-107. Grounds for termination of parental rights.

ence of the petitioner;
J of birth, and residence of the child;
oner to the child;
tes of birth of the parents, if known;
>erson having legal custody or guardto the child, or the organization or
oviding care for the child;
ttion of parental rights is sought, in
and
* persons or the authorized agency to
p of the child might be transferred,
nsent, if any, previously executed by
I to the petition.

The court may terminate all parental rights with respect to one or lx»tl
parents if it finds any one of the following:
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the child;
(2) that the parent or parents have neglected or abused the child;
(3) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent;
(4) that the child is being cared for in an out-of-home placement undei
the supervision of the court or the division, that the division or othei
responsible agency has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate ser
vices and that either of the following circumstances exists:
(a) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumula
tive total period of one year or longer pursuant to court order and thi
parent has substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the
circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement
or
(b) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumula
tive total period of two years or longer pursuant to court order anc
the parent has been unable or unwilling to remedy the circumstances
that cause the child to be in out-of-home placement, and there iis £
substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercis
ing proper and effective parental care in the near future;
(5) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in this chapter;
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the parent or parents
(a) to support or communicate with the child;
(b) to prevent neglect of the child;
(c) to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental, or emotional
abuse of the child; or
(d) to avoid being an unfit parent;
(7) the parent or parents have voluntarily relinquished their parental
rights to the child, and the court finds that termination is in the child's
best interest; or
(8) the parent or parents, after a period of trial during which the child
was returned to live in his own home, substantially and continuously ox
repeatedly refused or failed to give the child proper parental care and
protection.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

' proceedings.
iarental rights has been filed, notice
f the hearing shall be provided, in
Procedure, to the parents, the guardstody of the child, and to any person
r on the question of termination of
ler service of summons is complete.
II be taken and the parties shall be
imons shall contain a statement to
parents are proposed to be perma: statement may be contained in the
i g or in a separate summons subsehd are governed by the Utah Rules
ises require the petitioner to estab>nce, and shall give full and careful
3d with regard to the constitutional
parent is found, by reason of his
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History: C. 1953, 78-3f-107, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 10.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

78-3f-108. Evidence of grounds for termination.
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have abandoned a child, it
is prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or parents:
(a) although having legal custody of the child, have surrendered physical custody of the child, and for a period of six months following the
surrender have not manifested to the child or to the person having the
physical custody of the child a firm intention to resume physical custody
or to make arrangements for the care of the child; or
(b) have failed to communicate with the child by mail, telephone, or
otherwise for six months or failed to have shown the normal interest of a
natural parent, without just cause.
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are unfit or have neglected
a child the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following conditions:
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the parent
that renders him unable to care for the immediate and continuing physical or emotional needs of the child for extended periods of time;
(b) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally, or sexually
cruel or abusive nature;
(c) habitual or excessive use of intoxicating liquors, controlled substances, or dangerous drugs that render the parent unable to care for the
child;
(d) repeated or continuous failure to provide the child with adequate
food, clothing, shelter, education, or other care necessary for his physical,
mental, and emotional health and development by a parent or parents
who are capable of providing that care. However, a parent who, legitimately practicing his religious beliefs, does not provide specified medical
treatment for a child is not for that reason alone a negligent or unfit
parent;
(e) conviction of a felony, if the facts of the crime are of such a nature
as to indicate the unfitness of the parent to provide adequate care to the
extent necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health and
development;
(f) if the parent is incarcerated as a result of conviction of a felony, and
the sentence is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal
home for more than one year;
(g) injury or death of a sibling of the child due to known or substantiated abuse or neglect by the parent or parents;
(h) a history of violent behavior; or
(i) a single incident of life-threatening or gravely disabling injury to or
disfigurement of the child.
(3) If a child has been placed in the custody of the division and the parent or
parents fail to comply substantially with the terms and conditions of a plan to
reunite the family within six months after the date on which the child was
placed or the plan was commenced, whichever occurs later, that failure to
comply is evidence of failure of parental adjustment.
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History: C. 1953, 78-3M08, enacted b>
1992, ch. 221, § 11.

78-3M09- Specific consid
physical custody
(1) If a child is not in the phys
court, in determining whether ps
consider, but is not limited to, tl
(a) the services provided or«
a reunion with the child;
(b) the physical, mental, or
and his desires regarding the t
sufficient capacity to express
(c) the effort the parent or
stances, conduct, or condition
return him to his home after
not limited to:
(i) payment of a reason
maintenance, if financial
(ii) maintenance of re*
child that was designed a
with the parent or parei
(iii) maintenance of re;
custodian of the child.
(2) For purposes of this sectior
duct, contributions, contacts, anc
History: C. 1953, 78-3M09, enacted b
1992, ch. 221, § 12.

78-3M10. Specific consic
placed in fostei
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78-3f-110

active Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
nakes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

History: C. 1953, 78-3M08, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 11.

for termination.

78-3M09. Specific considerations where child is not in
physical custody of parent.

rents have abandoned a child, it
at the parent or parents:
te child, have surrendered physiod of six months following the
tild or to the person having the
ition to resume physical custody
of the child; or
;he child by mail, telephone, or
> shown the normal interest of a
ents are unfit or have neglected
ited to, the following conditions:
mental deficiency of the parent
rimediate and continuing physiextended periods of time;
cally, emotionally, or sexually
icating liquors, controlled subtle parent unable to care for the
rovide the child with adequate
care necessary for his physical,
>pment by a parent or parents
However, a parent who, legiti>s not provide specified medical
son alone a negligent or unfit
the crime are of such a nature
to provide adequate care to the
lental, or emotional health and
It of conviction of a felony, and
Id will be deprived of a normal
ild due to known or substantia
parents;
r gravely disabling injury to or
f the division and the parent or
rms and conditions of a plan to
» date on which the child was
r occurs later, that failure to
istment.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

(1) If a child is not in the physical custody of the parent or parents, the
court, in determining whether parental rights should be terminated shall
consider, but is not limited to, the following:
(a) the services provided or offered to the parent or parents to facilitate
a reunion with the child;
(b) the physical, mental, or emotional condition and needs of the child
and his desires regarding the termination, if the court determines he is of
sufficient capacity to express his desires; and
(c) the effort the parent or parents have made to adjust their circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child's best interest to
return him to his home after a reasonable length of time, including but
not limited to:
(i) payment of a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and
maintenance, if financially able;
(ii) maintenance of regular visitation or other contact with the
child that was designed and carried out in a plan to reunite the child
with the parent or parents; and
(iii) maintenance of regular contact and communication with the
custodian of the child.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court shall disregard incidental conduct, contributions, contacts, and communications.
History: C. 1953, 78-3M09, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 12.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

78-3f-110. Specific considerations where a child has been
placed in foster home.
If a child is in the custody of the division and has been placed and resides in
a foster home and the division institutes proceedings under this part regarding the child, with an ultimate goal of having the child's foster parent or
parents adopt him, the court shall consider whether the child has become
integrated into the foster family to the extent that his familial identity is with
that family, and whether the foster family is able and willing permanently to
treat the child as a member of the family. The court shall also consider, but is
not limited to, the following:
(1) the love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the
child and the parents, and the child's ties with the foster family;
(2) the capacity and disposition of the child's parents from whom the
child was removed as compared with that of the foster family to give the
child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education of the
child;
(3) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory foster
home and the desirability of his continuing to live in that environment;
(4) the permanence as a family unit of the foster family; and
49
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(5) any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular placement of a child.
History: C. 1953, 78-3M10, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 13.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

78-3M11. Court disposition of child upon termination.
(1) Upon entry of an order terminating the rights of the parent or parents,
the court may:
(a) place the child in the legal custody and guardianship of a licensed
child placement agency or the division for adoption; or
(b) make any other disposition of the child authorized under Section
78-3a-39.
(2) All adoptable children shall be placed for adoption.

History: C. 1953, 78-3M13, enacte<
1992, ch. 221, § 16.

78-3f-114. Voluntary re
(1) Voluntary relinquishmen
shall be signed or confirmed ur
jurisdiction over proceedings for
any other state, or a public offi*
taking consents or relinquishn
(2) The court or appointed off
consent or relinquishment has
quishment and has signed it )
(3) A voluntary relinquishn
rights is effective when it is *

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

History: C. 1953, 78-3M11, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 14.

78-3M12. Review following termination.
(1) At the conclusion of the hearing in which the court orders termination
of the parent-child relationship, the court shall order that a review hearing be
held within 90 days following the date of termination if the child has not been
permanently placed.
(2) At that review hearing, the agency or individual vested with custody of
the child shall report to the court regarding the plan for permanent placement
of the child. The guardian ad litem shall submit to the court a written report
with recommendations, based on an independent investigation, for disposition
meeting the best interests of the child.
(3) The court may order the agency or individual vested with custody of the
child to report, at appropriate intervals, on the status of the child until the
plan for permanent placement of the child has been accomplished.
History: C. 1953, 78-3M12, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 221, § 15.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

78-3M13. Effect of decree.
(1) An order for the termination of the parent-child legal relationship divests the child and the parents of all legal rights, powers, immunities, duties,
and obligations with respect to each other, except the right of the child to
inherit from the parent.
(2) An order or decree entered pursuant to this part may not disentitle a
child to any benefit due him from any third person, including, but not limited
to, any Indian tribe, agency, state, or the United States.
(3) After the termination of a parent-child legal relationship, the former
parent is neither entitled to any notice of proceedings for the adoption of the
child nor has any right to object to the adoption or to participate in any other
placement proceedings.
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steed for adoption.

(1) Voluntary relinquishment or consent for termination of parental rights
shall be signed or confirmed under oath before a judge of any court that has
jurisdiction over proceedings for termination of parental rights in this state or
any other state, or a public officer appointed by that court for the purpose of
taking consents or relinquishments.
(2) The court or appointed officer shall certify that the person executing the
consent or relinquishment has read and understands the consent or relinquishment and has signed it freely and voluntarily.
(3) A voluntary relinquishment or consent for termination of parenltel
rights is effective when it is signed and may not be revoked.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221,
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
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CHAPTER 3g
FOSTER CARE CITIZEN REVIEW
BOARD
Sunset — Laws 1993, ch. 173, § 5 provides that ch. 173, which enacted this chapter, is
repealed on April 1, 1995.
Section
78-3g-101.
78-3g-102.

Section
Definitions [Effective until
April 1, 1995].
Citizen Review Panel Steering
Committee — Membership—

78-3g-103.

Chair — Staff support [Effective until April 1, 1995].
Citizen review panels [Effective
until April 1, 1995].

78-3g-101. Definitions [Effective until April 1, 1995].
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Committee" means the Citizen Review Panel Pilot Project Steering
Committee created in this section.
(2) "Division" means the Division of Family Services within the Department of Human Services.
(3) "Office" means the Office of Social Services within the Department
of Human Services.
(4) "Panel" means a Citizen Review Panel created in Section
78-3g-103.
(5) "Plan" or "plans" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection 78-3f-103(3).
History: C. 1953, 78-3g-101, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 173, § 2.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 173, *i 6
makes the act effective on July 1, 1993.
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ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK #6183
Blakelock and Stringer, P.A.
Attorneys for Appellee
37 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 375-7678

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JANET BOWCUT (deceased), and
HELEN JENSEN, individually
and as the Guardian and
Conservator of the minor child
DAVID C. BOWCUT,
Appellee,

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
APPELLEE'S MOTION TO AFFIRM AND
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

vs.
CASE NO. 940361-CA

DON LESLIE BOWCUT,
Appellants.

COMES NOW the Appellee, by and through her counsel of record
and as for a Memorandum

In Response to Request for Summary

Disposition and Memorandum in Support of Appellee's Motion To
Affirm the Order and In Support of Motion For Sanctions, submits
the following:

RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT
Motion for Summary Disposition, in The Utah Court of Appeals,
requesting Summary Disposition of the Order on Ruling: Child
support,

of

Judge

Steven

Hansen,

entered

May

13,

1994.

Specifically, the Appellant requests the Court make a determination
for Summary Disposition based upon two issues;
i. The child's custodial status, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i. The child's custodial status, and
ii. whether or not the court had jurisdiction to make a
determination, as to child support.

RELIEF SOUGHT BY "APPELLEE"
The Plaintiff in this matter is deceased, having died prior to
the institution of the present matters on appeal. The trial Court
and the Appellant have identified the deceased Plaintiff as the
"Appellee11, but the true party opponents in this Appeal are the
minor child, David Bowcut ( with his court appointed Guardian Ad
Litem ), and the said child's Guardian (grandmother), Helen Jensen.
For purposes of this Appeal, they are designated and referred to
together as "Appellee", and separately referred to, as necessary,
by their individual names, "Jensen" or "David".
Appellee Moves the Court both to deny the Appellant's
Request for Summary Disposition, and to Affirm the Order On Ruling:
Child Support, which is the subject of the above entitled matter on
the grounds and for the reasons that:
i. the

issue of

custody

was

never

raised

in the

proceedings which are being appealed, at the trial court
level, and is raised for

the first

time on appeal.

ii. the issue of jurisdiction was raised by Motion to
Dismiss, at the November 4th Hearing, which Motion was denied
by

Ruling

issued

November

24th,

1992. The Ruling

dispositive, and the Appellant .never again raised

the

was
issue,

appearing generally in all subsequent proceedings.
iii. it is the child's right to support that is at the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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heart of this matter, and neither the Notice of Appeal nor the
Request for Summary Disposition were mailed to or served upon
the Guardian Ad Litem (legal counsel) for the minor child. See
the mailing Certificates to the Notice of Appeal, Docketing
Statement,

and the Request for Summary Disposition, on

file with this Court.

Appellee also Moves the Court for sanctions in the form of
fees and costs incurred in the response to this Appeal generally,
and in the response to the Request for Summary Disposition,
specifically.
Appellant's Request should be dismissed, and, since the
Appellant has placed "all of his eggs in one basket", the Appeal
should

be

dismissed;

further,

the

Appellee's

Motions

for

Affirmation of the Ruling (Order On Ruling: Child Support) of the
Trial Court, and for sanctions in the form of attorney's fees
should be granted.

FACTUAL GROUNDS
1. On or about October 27, 1993, an Order to Show Cause was
filed in Fourth District Court by Helen Jensen, Guardian and
Conservator of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, regarding
the issue of child support.
2. On November 4, 1993 an Order To Show Cause hearing was held
before Judge Steven Hansen, regarding the issue of child support.
Robert Moody, appeared for the Appellant, Don Leslie Bowcutt.
3
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3. On or about October 27, 1993, the Appellant, through
counsel, filed a Motion To Dismiss the Order To Show Cause, along
with a Memorandum in Support thereof.
4.

Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator, filed a Response

to Motion To Dismiss Order To Show Cause on November 4, 1993.
5.
Cause,

On November 4, 1994, at a Hearing on the Order To Show
the

Court

took

argument

from

counsel,

regarding

jurisdiction, child support arrearages and Appellant's on-going
child support obligation and took the matter under advisement.
6.

On November 24, 1994, the honorable Judge Steven L.

Hansen, issued a Ruling regarding the issues of on-going child
support, and jurisdiction.
7.

On November 24, 1993, the Court found that the Appellant

had an on-going support obligation to the minor child.
8. On November 24, 1993, the Court found that minor child,
David Charles Bowcutt, did have standing to maintain an action
against his natural father for support, via a Guardian Ad Litem,
and Ron Wilkinson, was appointed as Guardian Ad Litem.
9.

On November 24, 1993, with regard to jurisdiction, the

court found that the court has continuing jurisdiction to make an
award of child support, pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(3).
10. The court ordered a special review hearing to "determine
the status and needs of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, as
well as Defendant's

[Appellant's] current income level.n (See

Attachment A, point # 7 ) .
11. No appeal was filed regarding the November 24, 1993,
4
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Ruling of the Trial Court, which included Findings of Fact, and
Conclusions of Law on the issues of jurisdiction and child support
obligations.
12.

On December 23, 1993, the hearing was held before Judge

Hansen, regarding the status of the case and the Appellant's
financial status for purposes of establishing the amount of child
support.

Appearing at the hearing held December 23, 1993, the

Appellant's counsel made a request for an Evidentiary Hearing,
regarding only the pmount of the child support, not whether there
should be child support.
13. No appeal was filed regarding the court's decision to
conduct an Evidentiary Hearing to establish the amount of child
support obligation of the Appellant.
14. On March 21, 1994, an Evidentiary Hearing was held,
regarding the sole issue of the amount of Appellants child support
obligation for the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt.
15. The minor child was not present

in court, but was

represented by his Guardian Ad Litem, Ron Wilkinson.
16. The minor child's maternal grandmother, and Guardian and
Conservator, Helen Jensen, was also present, with her counsel,
Rosemond Blakelock.
17. The Trial

Court, at the Evidentiary

Hearing, heard

argument and testimony regarding the Appellant's ability to provide
support for the minor child, David Bowcutt, and the said minor
child's need for on-going support.
18. The Trial Court then took the matter of the amount of

5
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child support under advisement, and on or about April 5, 1994, made
a Ruling,

issuing

Findings of

Fact and Conclusions

of Law,

concerning the amount of child support to be assessed.

see

attachment B.
19. The issue of the custodial

status

of the minor child, was

never brought before the trial court.
20. At no time prior to filing this appeal, has the Appellant
challenged the jurisdiction
21.

of the court.

Appellant, either personally or through counsel, made a

general appearance at all hearings,

provided testimony to the

court regarding his opinion as to the monthly expenses and needs of
his minor child, David Bowcutt, and in all other matters submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, without objection.
See attachment B, introductory comments, also see point #4, 3rd
paragraph, attachment B.
22. On the 24th day of December, 1993, the 30-day appeal
period on the November 23, 1993 Ruling (Findings and Conclusions)
concerning jurisdiction and the obligation (not amount), ran out.
23. On the 27th day of January, 1994 (allowing for a few
holidays) the 30-day appeal period on the December 23, 1993 Ruling,
ran out.
24. On the 13th day of May, 1994, Judge Hansen issued the
Ruling establishing the amount of the child support, from which
Ruling the Appellant appeals.

See attachment C.

25. Appellant filed the notice of appeal on or about the 10th
of June, 1994.

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26. It is the child's

right

to support

that is at the heart of

this matter, and neither the Notice of Appeal, nor the Docketing
Statement, nor the Request for Summary Disposition were mailed to,
or served upon, the Guardian Ad Litem (legal counsel) for the minor
child. See the mailing Certificates to the Notice of Appeal,
Docketing Statement and the Request for Summary Disposition, on
file with this Court.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLANT'S "REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION"
EXHIBITS A FAILURE TO THOROUGHLY READ EITHER THE RULING,
OR RULE 10 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule 10, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows for
summary disposition under only three circumstances:
1. The Appellate court has no jurisdiction.
There is no contention in the Appellant's request that the
Appellate Court does not have jurisdiction.
2. To affirm the order of judgment which is the subject
of review.

Appellant has not asked for summary affirmation,

to the contrary, he asks for summary reversal.
3. To reverse the order or judgment which is the subject
of review on the basis of manifest error.
Although the Appellant's request comes closest to this third
category, he does not and, in fact cannot, cite to manifest error,

7
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because he requests that the Court of Appeals rule on two issues
which were not before the trial court at the March 21, 1994
Evidentiary Hearing.
It is apparent that the Appellant does not understand the
procedure and/or process of requesting a Summary Disposition. While
the Appeal is on it's face made "pro se11, it becomes apparent that
the Appellant has had the assistance of legally-trained persons in
the research and preparation of the matter before the Court*
Appellee asks the Court to look past this ruse, and hold the
Appellant to the standard of the Rules, in reviewing his pleadings
and in determining whether to grant the relief requested.
It is the Appellant's request that his Appeal be decided based
upon

the

two

issues

presented

in

his

Request

For

Summary

Disposition. Based upon the facts at the trial level, the request
for summary reversal of the Trial Court should be denied; and based
upon his own framing of the issues, the Appeal itself should be
dismissed.
II.
THE RULING WHICH ESTABLISHED THE OBLIGATION
OP THE APPELLANT TO PAY SUPPORT, AND IN WHICH JURISDICTION
WAS DIRECTLY ADDRESSED, WAS NOT TIMELY APPEALED
AND IS NOW RES JUDICATA
The Ruling which made a determination as to the obligation of
the Appellant to pay support to the minor child, and which made the
initial and only determination as to jurisdiction, was made, on
November 24, 1993.
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4, the
8
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notice of appeal should have been filed with the trial court within
30 days after the entry of the order appealed from: By December 24,
1993.

No such appeal was timely taken.

Although both Appellant and his Counsel of record attended
additional hearings, and made additional pleadings, the issue

jurisdiction

was never

again raised

at

the Trial

Court

of

level.

While the Appellant might appeal the subsequent Ruling, as to
the amount of support, the issues of jurisdiction is Res Judicata.

III.
THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD,
ALTHOUGH ADDRESSED IN THE SEPARATE AND EARLIER
GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING,
WAS NOT AT ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF THIS APPEAL?
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT WAS THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT

The minor child does not reside with the Appellant (father).
The child's mother (now deceased) had legal custody under the
Divorce Decree. However, under the Order of the Probate Court on 3
September,

1993, the

Appellee

was

granted

Guardianship

and

Conservatorship of the said child. While this provided for the
residential status of the child, and for the need for a caretaker,
it did not terminate the Appellant's custodial or parental rights.
In it's Ruling, issued April 5, 1994 (See Attachment B), Judge
Hansen, addressed the issue of the minor child's residing with his
maternal grandmother, only from the standpoint of the Appellant#s
obligation to pay child support while the child resides elsewhere.

9
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The court referred to the decision in Durfee v. Purfee. 796 P. 2d
713 (Utah App. 1990), which cited to Ridino v. Riding, 8 Utah 2d
136, 139, 329 P.2d 878, 880 (1958):
The legal obligation to support one's child may only be
terminated by the legal adoption of the child by another
person. Riding v. Riding. 8 Utah 2d 136, 139, 329 P.2d 878,
880 (1958) . Appellant is therefore not excused from his
obligation to support his oldest child simply because the
child resides with and receives care from a third party, in
this case his grandmother. See In re Olsen. ill Utah 365, 180
P. 2d 210, 213-14 (1947) ("The fact that the maternal
grandparents honored the request of the dying mother to look
after the children certainly did not absolve the father of the
duty to furnish them necessaries.w).
Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah App, 1990).
The Appellant apparently is confusing the issue of
with that of the obligation

for

child

support

the court at the Evidentiary Hearing)*

custody

( which was before

There is no question as to

the fact that the Appellant retains his parental relationship to
and the legal custody of the minor child (obtained by operation of
law upon the death of the custodial parent).
However, the issue of "custody"

which the Appellant presents,

for the first time, in his request for Summary Disposition, was not
before the Trial Court in the Evidentiary Hearing held before Judge
Hansen on March 18, 1994, nor is it the subject of the Ruling
appealed from.

As the Trial Court stated, the sole issue was the

Appellant's ability

to provide

support for the minor child, and the

minor child's needs for support.

V

v
V
10
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IV.
JURISDICTION WAS PROPER,
HOWEVER, THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION WAS MOOT
ONCE THE APPELLANT FAILED TO FILE AN APPEAL ON THE
JURISDICTIONAL RULING, AND THEN APPEARED GENERALLY
SUBMITTING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Trial Court clearly had jurisdiction to make an award of
child support in this case, pursuant to both Utah Code and case
law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3, states clearly;
Every father shall support his child.
While the Appellant claimed (by way of a Motion to Dismiss at
the trial level) that the Trial Court could not make a Ruling
through the original Divorce Decree, the Trial Court addressed that
issue, denying the Motion, deferring to Durfee v Durfee.796 P.2
713, (Utah App. 1990), in the Ruling issued on November 24, 1993.
Appellant has never challenged that Ruling and it is not timely to
do so at this time.
Further, even if the Trial Court may have lost personal
jurisdiction over the Appellant, that argument was waived when,
after the initial ruling by way of denial of the Motion to Dismiss,
the

Appellant

appeared

generally,

and

participated

in,

the

challenge

jurisdiction

at

the

subsequent hearings.
The

Appellant

did

not

Evidentiary Hearing, nor did he appeal the (jurisdictional) Ruling
of November, 1993.
\

Y
li
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V.
APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO RECIPROCAL SUMKARY DISPOSITION,
BY WAY OF AFFIRMATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING,
BECAUSE THE APPELLANT HAS REQUESTED THAT THE COURT DETERMINE
THE APPEAL BASED UPON THE TWO ISSUES WHICH HE PRESENTED IN
HIS REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
The Appellant has requested that the court issue a ruling
based upon two issues (custody and jurisdiction) that wrender all
others moot11, effectively limiting his appeal to the two issues.
However, as pointed out earlier in this Memorandum, the issue of
jurisdiction was not timely appealed, and the issue of custody was
never an issue.
Appellee is aware that Summary Disposition is generally not
available

if any one of the issues raised

in the Docketing

Statement needs to be reviewed; and Appellee is aware that the
Appellant

has

nominally

raised

several

other

issues

in his

Docketing Statement. However, where the Appellant has himself
identified the two key issues on which his Appeal stands, and has
asked the Court to summarily decide the Appeal on these two issues
alone, the general Rule should be applied to allow the Appellee to
file for reciprocal Summary Disposition, by way of Affirmation of
the Trial Court's Ruling.
VI.
THE APPELLANT FAILED TO PROVIDE NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
AS REQUIRED BY THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Pursuant to Rule 3 (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the Appellant "shall" give notice of the filing of a
notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to

12
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counsel

of record of each party to the judgment or

order.

Attorney Ron Wilkinson was appointed as Guardian Ad Litem for
the minor child. The Appellant failed to notify the Guardian Ad
Litem at any point in the Appeals procedure:
i. Appellant failed to mail notice of the Notice of
Appeal to the Guardian Ad Litem.

See mailing certificate,

Notice of Appeal (which was called a "Motion To Appeal Order
On Ruling: Child Support" by Appellant).
ii. Appellant failed to provide notice and a copy of the
Docketing Statement to the Guardian Ad Litem. See the mailing
certificate.
iii. Appellant has failed to send notice of his Request
for Summary Disposition to the Guardian Ad Litem. See the
mailing certificate.

Due to the failure of the Appellant to comply with the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Appellate's appeal should be
dismissed.

vi/
BOWCUTT'S APPEAL AND SUBSEQUENT REQUEST FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION HAS NO REASONABLE BASIS IN LAW OR FACT
AND, THEREFORE, AN AWARD FOR DAMAGES AND REASONABLE
ATTORNEYS' FEES IS APPROPRIATE PURSUANT TO RULE 33,
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Appellant's Request For Summary Disposition not only fails to
establish

the

elements

for

Summary

Disposition,

but

more

fundamentally, has willfully mis-characterized the issues which he
13
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is able to appeal, or exhibits a blatant disregard of the Rules of
the Court of Appeals.
Further, Appellant failed to provide notice to the one

most essential

in this

case,

the Guardian Ad Litem for the

person

tdnor

child.
This is not a case where the Court should look leniently upon
an impoverished litigant, who appears without counsel, because he
cannot afford counsel. Appellant, for what ever reason, chose to
abandon

counsel, even

though, as a

practicing

certainly could have afforded an attorney.

physician

he

A reasonable view of

the pro se appearance may be that the attorney simply refused to
participate in an Appeal so specious and insupportable.
The Court assesses damages under Rule 33 "where there is no
basis for the argument presented and when the evidence or law is
mis-characterized and misstated". Eames v EamesP 735 P.2d 395, 397
(Utah App. 1987).
Bowcutt's Request for Summary Disposition

is based upon a

mis-characterization of the issues which the court should examine,
and he has made baseless arguments, as well as failing to follow
the notice requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Therefore, an award of damages and reasonable attorney's fees is
appropriate.
Even if the balance of the Appeal is allowed to stand, and the
remaining issues prove to be worthy of review, the Court should
award sanctions and damages in the form of interim fees and costs,
for having to respond to the Request for Summary Disposition. In
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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this regard, the Court should award at least $500.00, as the costs
and reasonable fees incurred, plus additional sanctions.

See

Attachment D.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Appellee, Helen Jensen, by and
through her attorney, respectfully requests that this Court:
i. Summarily deny the Appellant's Request for Summary
Disposition (reversal), and
ii. Grant the Appellee's Motion for Summary Affirmation
of the Trial Court, and
iii. Dismiss the Appeal.
Further, whether

the

Appeal

is dismissed,

the Appellee

respectfully requests the Appeals Court grant an award of damages
and reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to Rule 33.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of July, 1994.

/ Rosemond G. Bl^Je^Iock
Attorney for Appellee Jensen

MAILING

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum In Response to Request for Summary Disposition
and Memorandum in Support of Appellee's Motion To Affirm the Order
15
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and In Support of Motion For Sanctions to: Don Leslie Bowcutt,
1130 West State Road, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and Ron Wilkinson, 1139
South Orem Blvd. Orem Utah 84057, on this 6th day of July, 1994.

TOsenond BlakelcO Q 2 7
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TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE, RC.

TELEPHONE

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW

(801) 373-2721
FAX (801) 375-6293

FORMERLY

SSE&JESS'ms

CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY

..JOHN MOODY

2525 NORTH CANYON ROAD

Of Counsel

COUNTRY CLUB COURT

^ _ _ „ ^T„nKTTr
D. EUGENE THORNE

PROVO, UTAH 84604

October 29, 1993

Rosemund Blakelock
Attorney at Law
Second Floor
37 East Center Street
Provo, UT 84601

.it

I

Re: Helen Jensen v. Don Bowcut
Dear Rose:
Before I begin responding to all of your hard work in the above-entitled matter,
let me share my thoughts with you.
Dr. Bowcut has never refused to support his child and, in fact, has attempted to
work with your client and was assured that by doing so the child would be enrolled in school and
that the purpose of the guardianship was not for the purpose of positioning for an economic war.
Dr. Bowcut has paid the child support regularly for over three years, is willing to
continue to pay the child support, and if we can work towards that end I would suggest that that
can be accomplished in a manner that would be fruitful.
Dr. Bowcut has been in the medical practice as a family practitioner for less than
a year. He has all of the start-up costs of a physician, is a solo practitioner and is not employed
by a clinic, hospital or other health-care facility. In addition, he is now obligated to begin paying
back large loans that were necessary to put him through medical school. He has not filed a tax
return since having begun practicing medicine but would opine that his gross income would not
exceed $6,000.00 a month at the present time.
He has and continues to offer David the same opportunities that the children of the
second marriage have but David would need to comply with the family agenda, which he has so
far been unwilling to do. If David cannot, and will not, comply with the family agenda then he
will continue on his own agenda as he is presently doing and Dr. Bowcut would offer his support
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but not for the agenda that David is presently following.
My analysis would indicate that Dr. Bowcut should pay not more than $300.00 a
month. Based upon the social security benefits that David is receiving as a result of his mother's
death, the $300.00 that Dr. Bowcut would pay would be more than sufficient to support David.
My information is that David is not going to school but working for an uncle and has income in
addition to father's support and social security. It may well be reasoned that, if my information
is correct, David may have become emancipated.
Dr. Bowcut has been unable to afford medical and dental insurance for his own
family but when that luxury is afforded, David would be covered. Until then, David, like the
other children, can receive medical care and treatment in his father's office.
There is no life insurance in place and none is offered.
My research is that the delinquent child support that you are seeking expired with
the death of the mother. That is a cause of action that belongs to her and belongs neither to
David nor his guardian. In addition, since Dr. Bowcut has made the monthly payments for over
three years, the larger part of that delinquency is barred by the statute of limitations.
I will appreciate your thoughts with regard to what we can do to resolve this thing
before preparing answers to your Summons and Petition and before making efforts to set aside
the guardianship. My client is not pleased with Helen Jensen and her express representations that *
the guardianship was for the express purpose of seeing that David was enrolled in school. He
is not enrolled in school as represented and Helen is now using the guardianship to position
herself in an economic war with Dr. Bowcut. I suggest that no one will come out the winner in
the present posture of this matter.
Your thoughts and suggestions will be appreciated.
Yours very truly,

Robert L. Moody
RLMrda
cc: Dr. Bowcut
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1

it, or if the Court so chooses, put in a trust fund

2

for him.

3

that is the right of the child.

But the child support is an obligation

The fact of his dysfunctional status at

4
5

this time doesn't lessen his needs in any way.

6

absolutely refuses —

7

guardianship —

8

father.

9

mother's death.

He

and thus the reason for the

to have a relationship with the

He feels abandoned at the point of the

But all that being said, coming down to

10
11

today, the status of the young man is still that he

12;

has needs.

13J

his grandmother's been permitting him to have that

14

for spending money and whatever he wants to spend

15

it on.

16

spending money and --

Now, he does get the 233 a month, and

I think he's got adequate food, lunch,

17

THE COURT: You don't dispute that that

18

should be considered by the Court in making a

19

judgment?

20

MS. BLAKELOCK: No, I think it must be

21

considered because that was the point of the Social

22

Security system.

23

the mother, that upon her death would be as though

24

she was paying child support or supporting him.

Was that was a benefit accrued by

So

2 51 I think it should be considered and I think it's to
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1

designed to put the Court in the position not to

2

have to assess each person's needs individually.

3

don't think he goes beyond or under the guidelines.

4

Nothing either side could present would muster to

5

that.

6

I

I think the only question for the Court to

7

decide is how does it considers the 233 a month.

8

If it considers it as income for the mother that

9

goes directly to the boy will impact differently

10

than if it's considered a form of just direct child

11

support.

12

I did research on that and wasn't able to

13

find direction into how that should be claimed.

14

But I think if the Court assumes even that in

15

instances where one party works —

16

was alive and working and earning minimum wage, the

17

father would pay very little different than if she

18

wasn't working at all, because the child support

19

guidelines are adjusted to that.

20

quit work and put the other parent's child support

21

way up.

22

if the mother

One parent can't

It's the equity of the guidelines.
Therefore, I think the 233 a month coming

23

in should be considered not just a lump to be taken

24

-- if his child support solely were $800 a month, I

25

don't think you'd take the 233 off, because that
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wouldn't be the effect if the mother were here and
still living.
THE COURT: What's wrong with considering
the 233 as if it was income from the mother on the
other side of the scale to the father's income, add
them together, come up with a percentage and
compute the amount?
MS. BLAKELOCK: That would be equitable.
Or considering that the mother had minimum wage,
and therefore 233 is what goes to him, I don't
think it matters.

I'm just saying that because of

the way the statute is

—

THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't say that was
income.

I think that would be her share of child

support.

In other words, if there's a total

combined child support award of $1,000 a month.
Her contribution is 233.
MS. BLAKELOCK: But that would equate to a
certain income on her part.

So I think that would

be a fair way of her percentage of that.

What I'm

saying is if solely his child support is 800, then
it is an 800 minus 233.
THE COURT: No.
MS. BLAKELOCK: But whatever other
formula --
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1

THE COURT: You plug the 233 into the

2

computation under the formula that is provided by

3

statute.

4

MS. BLAKELOCK: Yes, and that would be

5

fair.

6

appropriate.

7

Whatever came out, that would be

THE COURT: Well, what's the dispute, then,

8

Mr. Moody?

If we've got that figured out and we've

9

got his income, there's no dispute about that.

For

10

'93 I guess the issue is whether or not it should

11

be retroactive to the mother's death.

12

as '93 goes, why can't we just determine the child

13

support based on his income and the 233 and have

14

the two of you figure out the amount and come up

15

with a figure?

16

But as far

MR. MOODY: We can't, your Honor, because

17

the guidelines are only advisory.

They're not

18

mandatory.

19

for is Durfey versus Durfey, Pacific 2d. 796

I think the law the Court is searching
—

20

MS. BLAKELOCK: Do you have one for me?

21

MR. MOODY: No, I don't —

713.

It's a

22

case very similar where the mother died.

23

situation the Court stated that the overview

24

section of the guidelines indicate that final

25

orders of the case shall be made at the discretion
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In that

1

what the status was.

2

was already told at that point that he wasn't

3

willing to come live with me.

4

What my obligations were.

I asked what my obligations were regarding

5

ongoing support and future support, and they said

6

that I had no obligation either way.

7

support had, quote, "died with Janet."

8
9

attorney before -- she said, "Let me check with the
county attorney."

11

with that answer.

13
14

That the past

They said they'd check with the county

10

12

I

Q.

She checked and came back to me

(Inaudible) you to the contrary and your

desire is to support the boy; is it not?
A.

Yes, and I was told soon after that -- I

15

maintained after that I would support the boy after

16

he stayed in one place for any length of time.

17
18
19

Q.

What are your concerns about his staying

in one place for a given length of time?
A.

He needs to have some structure.

He won't

20

stay with me.

21

his grandmother.

22

that that's where he would be staying, but he

23

wouldn't.

24
25

Q.

I was hoping that he would stay with
Every place he went we assumed

What are your suggestions with regard to

structuring such monies as may be appropriate for
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total then would be approximately $7,040.
And that his $7,008 would be, you know, in
essence the sum total, but at least the majority of
the child support in that, in looking at the
guidelines under at least 7,000 a month, he's going
to be giving him 90 percent of the total, at least
responsible for 687, according to the statute.
THE COURT: Does that include three
children?
MS. BLAKELOCK: No, sir.
factored in.

That should be

I know that that goes —

there's the

formula sheet and it's worked out, and the number
of children, his income, that amount of child
support that he would pay.

Then that amount for

his children is deducted from his total income on a
monthly basis.
Then it's drawn over so that his income is
base as his gross income minus whatever he would
pay child support for those three.
down to a subgross, if you will.

Then that comes
Then that income

is the amount, if you consider the three children
that his child support should be based on.

I

think -THE COURT: Do you disagree that that
should be considered?
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Mr. Wilkinson not only cut it, he cut it

1

month.

2

more thLan ha If.

THE COURT: What does that compute, then?

3
4

His income is $7,000 a month.

I want some numbers.

5

MS. BLAKELOCK: That is

6

MR. WILKINSON: How I calculate it, it's up

7

to the Court 's discretion if they want to use the

8 j second job or not.
9

—

I assume the Court would use

the primary job, which my understanding is 5,000 a
You subtract from that the obligation to

10

month.

11

the chi Idren in his present home, which was $1,126.

12

Which I came up with as $2,700.

13

$4,000 a mon th that would be computed.

14

Approximately

MS. BLAKELOCK: Your Honor, this is a
He works part-time at one place and

15

physician.

16

part-time at another.

17

income is $84,000 a month.

18

burgers down at McDonald's.

19

and he goes to work.

His full-time physician
He's not flipping
He goes to the jail

20

THE COURT: Mr. Wilkinson or Mr. Moody,

21

both, why didn't you assume the Court could add

22

both of those together?

23

MR. WILKINSON: They certainly could.

24

wouldn' t have any objection to that.

25

was that we' d use his primary job.

I

My assumption
If that's a
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